A Statesman’s Gambit: Machiavelli’s Legacy

Few figures in political thought have generated as much debate, admiration, and condemnation as Niccolò Machiavelli. Reflecting that May 3^rd was his birthday, I thought it a rather useful thing to offer a reflection on why he remains a very central thinker for our times, especially given his role in inaugurating a distinctively modern understanding of politics through the concept of lo stato. While the term appears deceptively familiar to contemporary readers, as it is the very origins of the modern state, Machiavelli’s deployment of lo stato signals a profound rupture with both classical political philosophy and medieval Christian thought. In his writings, particularly Il Principe and the Discorsi, Machiavelli introduces a new conception of political form, grounded not in the pursuit of the good life or divine order but in power, necessity (necessità), and the ragion di stato, or reason of state.

This essay argues that lo stato in Machiavelli’s work is not simply a political entity but represents a paradigmatic shift in how political community and form are conceived. Rather than anchoring political life in transcendental ends—whether Aristotle’s telos or Augustine’s civitas Dei—Machiavelli constructs a self-referential model of politics: one in which the preservation, strength, and glory of the political form override traditional moral or religious constraints. Through this redefinition, Machiavelli emerges not merely as a political advisor but as a revolutionary founder of a new political ontology.

This foundational break has been interpreted in different lights. Leo Strauss famously cast Machiavelli as the “teacher of evil,” emphasizing the severing of politics from virtue. Maurizio Viroli, by contrast, positions Machiavelli as a civic republican whose innovations were intended to preserve liberty and autonomy, not merely power. Friedrich Meinecke charts the evolution of ragion di stato, recognizing Machiavelli’s role in laying the groundwork for modern political realism and its ethical ambiguities. These readings—Straussian, Cambridge, and realist—jointly illuminate how Machiavelli’s lo stato functions as the birthplace of the modern political form.

I. Machiavelli and the Invention of Lo Stato 

In the works of Machiavelli, the term lo stato appears with a frequency and emphasis that mark it as a central category of thought. Unlike the classical polis or the Christian civitas, lo stato is not a community aimed at the moral perfection of its members, but a political structure concerned primarily with order, preservation, and the exercise of power. This terminological shift signifies a reorientation of political thinking: from a focus on the ethical and spiritual ends of human life to the material and institutional conditions necessary for political survival.

In Il Principe, particularly Chapter VI, Machiavelli presents the founder of new orders as a figure of exceptional virtù—a secularized notion of excellence distinct from classical aretē (Machiavelli, The Prince 24). Here, Moses, Theseus, Romulus, and Cyrus are not celebrated for their moral virtue, but for their capacity to seize opportunity (occasione) and impose new laws and institutions. Virtù in this context is inseparable from necessità: the founder must do what is required, not what is conventionally good. Politics is no longer a branch of ethics but a domain of its own logic.

In the Discorsi, especially Book I’s Preface, Machiavelli reiterates his commitment to political realism. Drawing from Roman history, he advocates a politics grounded in historical contingency, conflict, and the necessity of founding stable institutions (Machiavelli, Discourses 14). The political community is seen as a dynamic system that requires constant renewal, discipline, and the occasional use of force. The letter to Francesco Vettori (December 1513) further reveals Machiavelli’s motivation: to contribute to the salvation and reordering of Italy through his new science of politics (Machiavelli, Selected Political Writings 124). It is in this letter that he declares his retreat from the noise of commerce to engage in dialogue with ancient thinkers—only to radically revise their conclusions.

Most importantly, lo stato in Machiavelli is a form that seeks to preserve itself. It is autonomous and self-contained. Its highest imperative is its own survival and strength, not the cultivation of virtuous citizens. Political action becomes arte dello stato—a craft or technique. This art is necessarily secular, pragmatic, and responsive to fortune (fortuna). The measure of political success is not justice or divine sanction but efficacy.

II. Leo Strauss: Machiavelli’s Break with Classical and Christian Traditions

Leo Strauss’s Thoughts on Machiavelli offers one of the most forceful interpretations of Machiavelli’s significance. For Strauss, Machiavelli represents the “first modern” because he consciously and systematically rejected the classical and Christian frameworks that had previously governed political thought. In place of politics as a means to the good life, Strauss argues, Machiavelli advanced politics as a science of power unconstrained by traditional morality (Strauss 9–11).

The classical tradition, as articulated by Plato and Aristotle, regarded politics as the arena in which human beings could realize their highest potential. Aristotle’s Politics defines the polis as existing for the sake of living well—not merely living. Political structures were judged by their capacity to cultivate virtue.

In contrast, the Christian tradition, especially in Augustine, subordinated politics to divine providence. The City of Man was a temporary and imperfect reflection of the eternal City of God. Politics was not an autonomous realm but a tool for sustaining earthly peace while orienting the soul toward salvation.

Machiavelli, Strauss argues, severs these connections. His politics are neither ethically ennobling nor theologically redemptive. Instead, they are governed by necessità and judged by results. The prince must be willing to act immorally if the preservation of the state requires it (Strauss 41).

Key to this transformation is the conceptual pair virtù and fortuna. Machiavelli’s prince is not a contemplative philosopher-king but a bold actor who wrestles with chance through strategic initiative. The political realm thus becomes a space of secular struggle, where human will confronts contingency without recourse to divine support or moral certainty.

Strauss sees this as the birth of modernity. With Machiavelli, politics is emancipated from theology and ethics. The political form—lo stato—is now defined by its capacity to maintain order and project power, not to reflect a moral or cosmic order. This enables the development of nationalism, ragion di stato, and modern power politics.

 

III. Viroli’s Republican Machiavelli and the Cambridge School Perspective

Maurizio Viroli’s interpretation of Machiavelli diverges sharply from Strauss’s indictment. While Viroli acknowledges Machiavelli’s rupture with the Christian tradition, he does not see this as a turn toward nihilism or pure amoralism. Rather, he reads Machiavelli as a civic republican concerned with liberty, the common good, and the preservation of a political form that empowers citizens (Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State 19).

In From Politics to Reason of State, Viroli traces the transformation of political language from civic republicanism to the modern discourse of raison d’état. He argues that while Machiavelli contributed to this transition, he himself remained committed to a vision of political life rooted in shared liberty (libertà) and active citizenship. For Viroli, lo stato is not merely a container for power but an artifact of civic achievement—a form that enables a free people to govern themselves (Viroli 23–27).

The degeneration of the republic occurs, in Machiavelli’s view, not when rulers employ force, but when political life is stripped of public participation. In Discorsi, he praises Rome’s institutional flexibility and its use of internal conflict to renew itself (Machiavelli, Discourses 31). The health of the state depends not on moral purity, but on its capacity to harness tumulti—the productive discord between elites and people.

Viroli’s Machiavelli is thus a modern republican, not a nihilist. While he departs from Christian metaphysics, he retains a secular form of civic morality rooted in patriotism, institutional resilience, and popular sovereignty.  For Viroli, lo stato in Machiavelli’s hands is not merely an instrument of domination but a form structured to safeguard republican liberty through active civic engagement and institutional balance (Viroli, Machiavelli 172–74).

In this reading, the use of force, cunning, and necessity in Machiavelli is not an end in itself but a means to preserve a political order that resists corruption and tyranny. Viroli emphasizes the Discorsi over Il Principe, pointing to Machiavelli’s admiration for the Roman Republic and his advocacy for a mixed constitution, public debate, and the role of the people in guarding liberty. The frequent recourse to war, deception, and punitive measures in his writings is interpreted not as amoral endorsements but as tragic necessities in a fallen world.

This interpretation, aligned with the Cambridge School’s attention to historical context and republican language, positions Machiavelli not as the father of modern tyranny but as the last great champion of the res publica. His innovation lies in giving political form a new grounding—no longer in virtue or grace, but in conflict, civic arms, and institutional maintenance against inevitable degeneration. Lo stato, then, is a republican form rooted in historically aware realism rather than transcendent ideals.

Nevertheless, even in this republican account, lo stato becomes the central reality around which political legitimacy revolves. Whether ruled by a prince or a people, the form itself—its preservation and adaptability—is what gives politics meaning. Viroli thus reframes Machiavelli’s radicalism not as a descent into realism but as a recalibration of republicanism to the brutal conditions of early modern Italy.

 IV. Friedrich Meinecke and Ragion di Stato: The Ethics of the Modern State

Friedrich Meinecke, in The Doctrine of Reason of State, offers another dimension to Machiavelli’s foundational role in shaping modern political form. Meinecke situates Machiavelli at the beginning of the development of ragion di stato—the idea that the interests of the state may justify actions beyond conventional moral norms (Meinecke 24–27). In this framework, lo stato is conceived as a distinct moral agent, with its own set of imperatives and logic.

For Meinecke, Machiavelli inaugurates a way of thinking where the state is no longer an expression of pre-existing ethical or theological order, but rather the creator of its own values. The prince, in this setting, does not simply administer laws; he founds a new political world. The modern state, then, arises not from natural communities or divine ordination but from acts of will, force, and calculated judgment.

This leads to a profound ambivalence. On one hand, ragion di stato enables the state to respond effectively to crisis and disorder—an essential capacity in a fragmented and violent world. On the other hand, it risks subordinating all human goods to state interests, potentially legitimizing tyranny and perpetual war.

Meinecke does not read Machiavelli as an advocate of unrestrained amorality, but he does mark him as the figure who made such justification possible by framing the state’s survival and glory as overriding goods. Thus, Machiavelli lays the groundwork for both the robust statecraft of Richelieu and the authoritarian strategies of the modern security state.

In this light, lo stato becomes the ultimate actor in history—its emergence marking a transformation in both the locus and language of politics. Political form is now constituted not by its teleological aims but by its capacity for survival, expansion, and order—ends which, in turn, redefine what counts as legitimate action.

 

V. Conclusion: Lo Stato as Modern Political Form

Across these interpretations—Strauss’s rupture, Viroli’s republicanism, and Meinecke’s realism—Machiavelli’s concept of lo stato emerges as the foundational shift in political form from classical and medieval paradigms to the modern one. No longer is politics about realizing human excellence or approximating divine justice. Instead, politics becomes a distinct sphere, guided by its own necessities, informed by history, and judged by its effectiveness in preserving order and power.

This transformation is not merely conceptual. It creates a new ontology of the political, one where the state is no longer the steward of virtue but the origin of order. The prince, the republic, the army, and the law are all instruments of form, understood not as an ideal constitution but as a real, durable structure.

Machiavelli thus stands as both a destroyer of old worlds and a founder of new ones. He does not simply describe power; he gives it a new shape. In lo stato, we see the beginning of the modern political condition: a secular, realist, and institutionally anchored form that has endured from the Italian Renaissance to the contemporary state system. Understanding Machiavelli’s lo stato is thus indispensable to understanding the political form that defines the modern age.

Works Cited Link