Being, Time, and Action

The Human State in Martin Heidegger’s and Hannah Arendt’s Phenomenology

Introduction

Martin Heidegger and his student Hannah Arendt, among the most influential thinkers in continental philosophy, offer profound yet contrasting philosophies on the human condition. Both are deeply rooted in the phenomenological tradition established by Edmund Husserl. Heidegger’s Being and Time explores the fundamental question of Being, examining human existence through the concept of Dasein, the being for whom Being is an issue (Hatab 2014). Heidegger aimed to investigate the implicit assumptions of the Aristotelian ideal of being as ousia, demonstrating that the foundation of all meaningful presence is Dasein, in its temporal context as human beings (Backman 2006). This work provides the groundwork for understanding human existence as a dynamic process of becoming, characterized by temporality, finitude, and the ongoing possibility of authentic self-understanding, framing Dasein’s essence in its openness to Being (Al-Raisi et al. 2020). Arendt, initially a student of Heidegger, later developed her distinctive political philosophy, most notably expressed in The Human Condition, shifting her focus from ontology to the political. She examines the human condition through labor, work, and action within the public sphere. Arendt’s work analyzes the vita activa, or active life, in its three essential capacities of labor, work, and action, emphasizing action as the most critical and distinctly human activity, since it is within the realm of action that humans demonstrate their freedom and uniqueness, engage in political discourse, and collectively shape their shared world.

Both Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, rooted in the phenomenological focus on lived experience, offer distinct perspectives: Heidegger emphasizes the individual’s existential inquiry through contemplative means, while Arendt highlights collective existence through active participation in the res publica, or the public sphere, in modern terminology. At the same time, Arendt emphasizes collective, intersubjective engagement. Their philosophies, often in tension, can complement each other by showing how the individual informs and is shaped by collective action.

As already disclosed in the abstract, this essay will examine Heidegger’s and Arendt’s conceptions of the human condition through three philosophical frameworks: (1) phenomenological foundations, contrasting Dasein’s ontological structure with the relational reality of plurality; (2) temporality and possibility, comparing Heidegger’s Being-towards-death with Arendt’s natality; (3) authenticity and freedom, juxtaposing Heidegger’s resoluteness with Arendt’s emphasis on action, (4) sociality and intersubjectivity, analyzing Dasein’s being-with others and Arendt’s notion of plurality, and (5) worldhood and the public realm, contrasting Heidegger’s concept of worldhood with Arendt’s public space. My analysis will argue that Arendt’s political phenomenology transforms Heidegger’s existential analytic into a relational framework, emphasizing collective action and intersubjectivity, while also demonstrating how individual existence, as expressed in Dasein’s ontology, can influence collective action, fostering a complementary dialogue. I will focus on the interplay between ontology and politics in shaping the human condition, providing insights into how Phenomenology can articulate human existence.

Phenomenological Foundations

Heidegger’s Being and Time provides the phenomenological foundation for understanding the human condition through the concept of Dasein, translated as “being-there” or existence. Dasein is defined by its distinctive mode of Being, characterized by existence, temporality, and historicity. It fundamentally differs from existing natural things, as its world is phenomenal and intrinsically connected to its Being (Gungov et al. 2008). Heidegger explains that Dasein is an entity that “is in each case mine,” and its Being is partly “proximally” and “for the most part” its own (Gungov et al. 2008). This ontological openness forms Dasein’s unique potentiality-of-Being, which is not merely a property but the core of its existence (Gungov et al. 2006), indicating that the human condition is a self-reflective, existential entity. Dasein’s social aspect, expressed through Mitsein, recognizes others: “The world of Dasein is a with-world.” However, Mitsein is ontologically secondary, as Heidegger emphasizes Dasein’s relationship to Being. Therefore, Heidegger’s view of Mitsein offers a limited account of sociality and appears subordinate to Dasein’s pursuit of authenticity.

In The Human Condition, Arendt reimagines the human state through a political phenomenology focused on plurality, which is the condition of humans being equal yet distinct. She describes three essential human activities—labor, work, and action—and emphasizes that action is the main expression of the human condition (Arendt and Canovan 1998). Arendt maintains that, unlike labor and work, action is fundamentally connected to the presence of others, as it requires a public space where individuals can reveal themselves through words and deeds.

Action involves direct interactions among people, happening in the public sphere where individuals reveal their unique identities through speech and actions. It is always unpredictable, embedded in a web of relationships, and starts with others. Arendt’s focus on action highlights the human ability to begin new things and shape events through collective effort. She sees this as the most important of the three activities of the vita activa.

Plurality defines the human state as inherently relational, shaped by a network of interactions that form a shared world. Unlike Heidegger’s Dasein, which prioritizes self-questioning, Arendt’s human state emerges through intersubjectivity, where the public realm serves as a space of appearance for diverse perspectives. Her phenomenology, influenced by Husserl’s concept of the lifeworld, views human existence as embedded in the political and social realms, in which action and speech create meaning and reveal identity.

In essence, the phenomenological differentiation between Heidegger and Arendt lies in their philosophical points of departure: Heidegger begins with Dasein’s existence and its relation to Being, whereas Arendt starts with the human condition of plurality, emphasizing relational existence and political action, with each perspective providing a unique, although not mutually exclusive, understanding of the human state.

Temporality and Possibility

Heidegger’s conception of temporality in Being and Time is fundamental to his understanding of the human state. Defined by its orientation toward future possibilities and awareness of death as its ultimate limit, Dasein’s existence is fundamentally temporal, always in a state of becoming. Death individualizes Dasein, compelling it to confront its finitude and prioritize its possibilities. Temporality serves as the horizon for Being, with the future holding primacy as Dasein projects itself toward what it can become. The past, characterized by thrownness, and the present, marked by fallenness, are integrated into this future-oriented structure. This temporal framework portrays the human state as a being-toward-possibility, where meaning arises from anticipating future existence. Heidegger’s focus on the future isolates Dasein from social or historical contexts, emphasizing individual existence over collective engagement. Dasein, through overcoming the “Das Man” condition, transitions into authenticity, entering a realm where its hyperbolic qualities determine its movement (Gungov et al. 2012).

Arendt’s temporality in The Human Condition centers on natality, the capacity for new beginnings inherent in human birth. Natality defines the human state as a source of novelty, expressed through action in the public sphere. Action initiates unpredictable futures, breaking from routine patterns and introducing change. in contradistinction to Heidegger’s death-oriented temporality, natality emphasizes the potential for creation, positioning the public realm as the site where new possibilities emerge through collective interaction. Arendt’s temporal framework balances past, present, and future, with action as a bridge connecting individual initiatives to communal outcomes. This relational temporality underscores the human state’s creative potential, where collective beginnings shape shared realities. Natality transforms Heidegger’s existential mode into an active and transformative force in the world, with the political capacity to initiate action and the revelatory capacity to disclose unique identities and possibilities, focusing on the collective options. The contrast between Heidegger’s death-focused temporality and Arendt’s natality highlights divergent views on human possibility. (Gungov et al. 2008). Heidegger’s temporality is individualistic, rooting human possibility in Dasein’s solitary anticipation of death. Arendt’s natality is collective, locating possibility in the public sphere where actions create new realities. Heidegger’s framework complements Arendt’s by grounding collective beginnings in individual temporality. Dasein’s future-oriented projection enables the personal decisions that initiate Arendtian actions. For example, an individual’s temporal awareness of future possibilities, informed by Dasein’s projection, can lead to public initiatives like organizing community projects, where personal vision shapes collective outcomes. A complementarity between both suggests that individual existential awareness and collective political action intertwine to realize human potential. Heidegger’s temporality supports the creative beginnings Arendt emphasizes, as Dasein’s ontological openness underpins the capacity to initiate collective change in the public sphere. Heidegger’s Dasein defines human possibility as an ontological projection toward future states of being. Arendt’s action concretizes possibility in the public realm, where individuals collectively shape their world. The interplay between these philosophical perspectives shows us how individual temporal awareness, rooted in Heidegger’s ontology, enables the collective possibilities that Arendt’s natality celebrates, bridging the individual and collective dimensions of the human state, which are critical for Human Authenticity and freedom, as we shall see in the following chapter.

Authenticity and Freedom

Heidegger’s conception of authenticity in Being and Time portrays the human state as capable of owning its existence. Authenticity involves overcoming the inauthentic conformity of the “they” (das Man), allowing Dasein to embrace its unique possibilities. Freedom is ontological, achieved through resoluteness, confronting thrownness and death. Resoluteness enables Dasein to choose its possibilities authentically, prioritizing its existence over external norms. This individualistic freedom focuses on Dasein’s self-appropriation, emphasizing existential clarity over social engagement. We can argue that authenticity leads to isolation, as Dasein distances itself from conventional society to realize its potential and neglects intersubjective relationships and responsibilities on account of qualified authenticity (Gungov et al. 2008). Heidegger’s ontology views freedom as an internal state, achieved through existential self-awareness and resoluteness, and this freedom is not about unconstrained acting but instead acting within the radical conditioning of thrownness in such a way that Dasein’s potentiality-for-Being is enhanced while providing the ontological groundworks for individual actions influencing collective contexts. As Alphonso Lingis says, Heidegger’s exaggerated anthropocentrism has led to an emphasis on a quasi-independent Being in his later writings (Gungov et al. 2012).

Arendt’s conception of authenticity and freedom in The Human Condition centers on action, defining the human state through public engagement. Freedom is realized through action, where individuals disclose their identities in the public sphere. Action requires the presence of others, as its authenticity depends on recognition within a plural community. Unlike behavior, which conforms to social norms, action is unique, unpredictable, and irreversible, revealing the actor’s distinctiveness. Storytelling preserves the significance of actions, transforming fleeting deeds into enduring narratives that shape collective memory. Arendt’s freedom is relational, emphasizing the public realm as the space where human authenticity emerges through intersubjective disclosure. Arendt’s action reconfigures Heidegger’s authenticity as a collective practice, prioritizing public engagement over individual existence. Action depends on intersubjective recognition, contrasting with Heidegger’s self-referential resoluteness. Arendt’s framework complements Heidegger’s by grounding political freedom in individual authenticity. Action’s uniqueness stems from the actor’s existential self-awareness, connecting personal authenticity to collective significance. Heidegger’s authenticity is inward, focusing on Dasein’s existential self-relation. Arendt’s authenticity is outward, realized through public action that discloses the individual within a collective context. Her critique of behavior as conformist echoes Heidegger’s rejection of das Man, reframing inauthenticity as a barrier to unique disclosure. However, Heidegger’s resoluteness complements Arendt’s action by grounding collective engagement in individual authenticity. An individual’s commitment to public action, shaped by existential self-awareness, can result in initiatives that redefine the public sphere, and her idea resonates with the need for public discourses that contribute to expression and prudent dialogues among citizens (Díaz 2013).

For instance, an individual’s authentic decision to challenge societal norms, rooted in Dasein’s resoluteness, can inspire collective action, illustrating how an individual’s being impacts the public sphere. Arendt’s political phenomenology converts Heidegger’s existential analytic into a relational framework, prioritizing collective action and intersubjectivity over individual Being. At the same time, Heidegger’s ontology enables the authentic initiatives that fuel Arendt’s political phenomenology.

Sociality and Intersubjectivity

Heidegger’s conception of sociality in Being and Time defines Dasein’s human state through its being-with (Mitsein), acknowledging others as part of its world. Dasein encounters others not as mere objects but as co-existent beings, sharing the world in everyday interactions. However, being-with is ontologically secondary to Dasein’s existence, as Heidegger prioritizes the self’s relation to Being. This limited sociality portrays the human state as primarily individual, with others supporting Dasein’s existential structure. In inauthentic modes, Dasein conforms to the “they,” losing its uniqueness, but authentic being-with allows Dasein to recognize others’ individuality while maintaining its own. Heideggge’s Sociality, compared to a more complete approach present in Levinas’s more elaborate philosophy, is underdeveloped, because, according to Levinas, if everything human is reduced to ontology, to be a man is to be in service of Being. Part of Being’s adventure is to obey something like the “faceless” fate (Gungov et al. 2006). Dasein’s interactions are existentially conditioned rather than ethically grounded (Gungov et al. 2006), but they facilitate Dasein’s self-discovery, emphasizing the individual’s ontological journey over collective engagement (Gungov et al. 2012). Dasein’s sociality reflects Heidegger’s broader focus on individual existence, where being-with is instrumental for Dasein’s self-understanding rather than a source of intersubjective value. However, it does not prevent Dasein from uniquely contributing to broader collective contexts.

Arendt’s political theory of plurality transforms Heidegger’s concept of being-with into a foundation for intersubjectivity and collective action, redefining the human state through the public sphere. Plurality involves equality and distinctness, allowing individuals to interact as unique beings in the public sphere. Action, the primary mode of plurality, fosters intersubjectivity by enabling individuals to disclose themselves through speech and deeds, creating a shared world of meaning. Unlike Heidegger’s being-with, Arendt’s intersubjectivity is constitutive, portraying the human state as emerging through collective engagement. The public realm serves as the space where diverse perspectives coexist, sustaining a communal reality through interaction. Arendt’s plurality transforms Heidegger’s sociality into a robust intersubjective framework, prioritizing collective engagement over individual existence. Her intersubjectivity is integral to the human condition, shaping a public sphere where collective and individual perspectives converge and the human state is defined through mutual recognition and concerted action. Both Arendt’s and Heidegger’s approaches to intersubjectivity recognize the transformative potential of human interaction in shaping individual and collective existence. Heidegger’s being-with acknowledges others but subordinates sociality to individual Being. Arendt’s plurality elevates intersubjectivity as the essence of the human state. However, Heidegger’s Dasein supports Arendt’s framework by grounding collective intersubjectivity in individual sociality. Dasein’s capacity for authentic being-with enables the unique contributions that enrich Arendt’s public sphere, such as an individual’s participation in a community dialogue that fosters collective understanding. Again, as seen previously, Heidegger’s individual sociality, rooted in Heidegger’s ontology, fuels Arendt’s vision for collective intersubjectivity, creating a rich and dynamic political space (Guignon 2010).

Heidegger’s existential focus on Dasein neglects the political dimensions of human existence, a gap that Arendt addresses through her theory of action and the public sphere. Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein’s being-in-the-world emphasizes individual existence, where authenticity requires Dasein to confront its finitude and take ownership of its existence (Heinz 2015). This orientation directs Dasein inward, valuing self-understanding over public engagement, resulting in a limited view of political life. Heidegger’s focus on the individual doesn’t account for power, justice, and collective responsibility dynamics. Even so, it’s important to remember that Heidegger’s dis-attending to a fixed conception of politics might open a deeper exploration of politicization, moving away from predefined political spaces. However, Heidegger’s emphasis on individual authenticity can indirectly support political action. For example, Dasein’s resolve can encourage individuals to challenge unjust systems, even if Heidegger doesn’t explicitly promote political engagement.

Arendt, deeply influenced by classical Greek political thought, views the public realm as essential to a meaningful existence, offering a guarantee against the futility of individual life (Schlesinger 2020). She argues that action and speech in the public sphere create a space where individuals can attain immortality through remembrance. Unlike Heidegger, Arendt focuses on collective action and intersubjectivity, emphasizing the human state as realized through political participation. This active engagement transforms individuals from private beings into citizens who shape their community. She analyzes the vita activa, which includes labor, work, and action, stressing often-overlooked distinctions and critiquing modern perceptions (Arendt 1958). She sees the social realm as a threat, invading private and public spheres by making biological needs public matters (Arendt 1958). While Arendt acknowledges labor’s importance, she warns against letting it dominate human life, which would reduce individuals to mere producers and consumers. Arendt’s framework transforms Heidegger’s existential insights into a relational, political framework, highlighting the transformative potential of collective action in defining the human state. Her interpretations add a collective, intersubjective dimension that overcomes the intrinsic limits of Heidegger’s more solitary focus on Dasein, leading to a political phenomenology of the human state.

Worldhood and the Public Realm

Heidegger’s conception of worldhood in Being and Time defines the human state through Dasein’s being-in-the-world. The world is not a mere collection of objects but a meaningful context of relations, shaped by Dasein’s practical engagement. Worldhood involves equipment, tasks, and purposes, forming a referential totality where Dasein navigates its existence. This world is shared through being-with, but its primary significance lies in Dasein’s projects. In inauthentic modes, Dasein conforms to the world’s norms, losing its existential clarity, while authentic worldhood aligns the world with Dasein’s possibilities. Heidegger’s worldhood prioritizes individual meaning-making over collective contexts. However, this individual focus enables Dasein to contribute to shared worlds. Authentic Dasein enriches communal understanding by integrating its unique insights into the world, creating an opening for the intersubjective exchange that Arendt envisions.

In contrast to Heidegger’s focus on individual existence, Arendt emphasizes the public realm as the sphere where human beings appear to each other as distinct individuals, engage in action and speech, and establish a shared world of meaning. The public realm in The Human Condition portrays the human state as realized through collective action. The public realm is the space of appearance, where individuals disclose themselves through action, creating a shared world of meaning. Unlike the private realm of labor or work, the public realm sustains plurality, allowing diverse perspectives to coexist. Action shapes this realm by initiating new realities, preserved through storytelling that transforms deeds into lasting narratives. Arendt’s public realm is inherently intersubjective, defining the human state as a collective endeavor. Arendt’s public realm reconfigures Heidegger’s worldhood into a political space of collective engagement. Their conceptions of worldhood and the public realm are complementary. Heidegger’s worldhood is individual-centric, focusing on Dasein’s practical engagement. Arendt’s public realm is collective, emphasizing intersubjective action. Yet, Heidegger’s worldhood supports Arendt’s framework by grounding collective worlds in individual meaning-making. Dasein’s engagement with the world enables the actions that shape Arendt’s public realm, such as an individual’s contribution to a public project that enhances communal identity. This synergy shows how individual worldhood, rooted in Heidegger’s ontology, contributes to the collective public realm that Arendt champions.

Therefore, Arendt’s framework transforms Heidegger’s existential insights into a relational, political framework, highlighting the transformative potential of collective action in defining the human state. Her interpretations add a collective, intersubjective dimension that overcomes the intrinsic limits of Heidegger’s more solitary focus on Dasein, leading to a political phenomenology of the human state (Guignon 2010; Palompon 2019).

Conclusion

The comparison of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time and Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition reveals a profound and complementary interplay of phenomenological conceptions of the human state, illuminating the dynamic tension and synergy between ontology and politics in 20th-century continental philosophy. Heidegger’s Dasein articulates the human as an ontologically open being, whose existence is defined by its existential questioning of Being, temporal projection toward death, resolute authenticity, limited sociality, and individual worldhood. Arendt’s political phenomenology reconfigures this framework, portraying the human state as a plural, action-driven reality realized through collective engagement, natality, public disclosure, intersubjectivity, and the public realm. This transformation does not negate Heidegger’s ontology but builds upon it, reorienting its individual focus toward a relational model that prioritizes collective action and intersubjectivity. Yet, the complementarity of their philosophies lies in their mutual illumination: Heidegger’s ontology provides the existential foundation for the individual initiatives that fuel Arendt’s collective actions, demonstrating how individual being shapes and is shaped by communal existence.

Heidegger’s Dasein offers a metaphysical depth that grounds the human state in its capacity to question existence, a perspective that resonates with phenomenology’s roots in Husserl’s call to return to lived experience.

By emphasizing Dasein’s ontological openness, Heidegger establishes the individual as capable of self-reflection and projection, providing the existential clarity necessary for meaningful action. This individual focus, though abstract, enables the unique contributions that Arendt’s political phenomenology celebrates. For instance, Dasein’s resolute choice to embrace its possibilities can manifest as an individual’s decision to lead a public initiative, such as organizing a civic movement, which aligns with Arendt’s vision of action as a disclosure of the self within a plural community. Heidegger’s ontology, while individualistic, provides the existential groundwork for such actions, suggesting that the human state’s capacity for collective engagement presupposes an individual’s ontological awareness.

Arendt’s political phenomenology, in turn, transforms Heidegger’s framework by situating the human state within the intersubjective space of the public realm. Her emphasis on plurality and action redefines human existence as inherently relational, where meaning emerges not from solitary introspection but from collective interaction. This shift aligns with phenomenology’s broader evolution toward intersubjectivity, as seen in thinkers like Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who emphasize the embodied and relational nature of experience.

Arendt’s focus on natality, intersubjectivity, and the public realm offers a normative vision of the human state, where collective action creates new realities and sustains a shared world. Yet, her framework relies on the individual’s capacity to initiate action, a capacity rooted in Heidegger’s Dasein. For example, an individual’s authentic projection toward possibilities, as articulated in Heidegger’s temporality, enables the innovative actions that Arendt associates with natality, such as launching a community dialogue that reshapes collective identity. This interplay underscores the complementary nature of their philosophies, where individual being and collective action form a dialectical relationship.

The five analytical frameworks—phenomenological foundations, temporality and possibility, authenticity and freedom, sociality and intersubjectivity, and worldhood and the public realm—reveal the depth of this complementarity. Heidegger’s ontology provides the existential structure for individual agency, while Arendt’s political phenomenology channels this agency into collective endeavors. Their dialogue reflects broader tensions in continental philosophy, particularly the challenge of reconciling metaphysical inquiry with practical engagement. Heidegger’s focus on Being aligns with the speculative tradition of German idealism. At the same time, Arendt’s emphasis on action resonates with the pragmatic turn in political philosophy, as seen in thinkers like Jürgen Habermas, who advocate for communicative action in the public sphere. Their complementary approaches suggest that the human state is neither purely individual nor wholly collective but a synthesis of both, where ontological openness enables intersubjective creativity.

This synthesis has profound implications for phenomenology’s understanding of the human state. Heidegger’s Dasein provides a foundational account of human existence, emphasizing the individual’s capacity for self-understanding and possibility. Arendt’s plurality and action extend this account to the collective, highlighting the human state’s relational and creative dimensions. Together, they offer a holistic vision of human existence, where individual being informs collective reality, and collective action shapes individual identity. This complementarity challenges the traditional dichotomy between ontology and politics, suggesting that a complete understanding of the human state requires both perspectives.

For instance, a single individual’s authentic decision to engage in public discourse, rooted in Heidegger’s resoluteness, can spark collective change, as Arendt envisions, illustrating the dynamic interplay between the two.

In the broader context of 20th-century philosophy, Heidegger and Arendt’s dialogue addresses enduring questions about human existence, agency, and community. Their work responds to the crisis of modernity, where traditional frameworks for meaning-making have eroded, necessitating new ways of understanding the human state.

Heidegger’s ontology offers a response grounded in existential clarity, while Arendt’s political phenomenology provides a practical framework for collective renewal. Their complementary philosophies suggest that phenomenology, as a method, can bridge speculative and practical concerns, offering a versatile approach to articulating human existence. This dialogue remains relevant for contemporary philosophy, where debates about individual agency, collective responsibility, and the public sphere continue to shape political theory and phenomenology discussions.  Heidegger’s exploration into concealedness within Being and Time serves as a vital opening, although the precise nature of its politicization remains subject to interpretation (Bensussan 2010).

Ultimately, Heidegger and Arendt’s conceptions of the human state enrich phenomenology by demonstrating its capacity to navigate the tension between individual and collective dimensions of existence. Heidegger’s Dasein grounds the human state in ontological openness, providing the existential foundation for individual agency. Arendt’s plurality and action transform this foundation into a relational framework, emphasizing the human state’s collective potential. Their complementary interplay—where individual being enables collective action, and collective action shapes individual identity—offers a profound vision of the human state, affirming phenomenology’s enduring relevance in articulating the complexities of human existence. By investigating lived experiences, phenomenology attempts to discover truth and asserts the existence of a socially created environment that has been internally mediated (Alhazmi and Kaufmann 2022).  The relational framework proposed here demonstrates that Arendt’s political phenomenology transforms Heidegger’s existential analytic, emphasizing collective action and intersubjectivity over individual Being. In contrast, individual being enables collective action, and collective action shapes individual identity, maintaining the possibility of Beings’ openness that affirms phenomenology’s enduring relevance in articulating the complexities of human existence.

 

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