Trump’s Chaos Defies Schmitt’s Doctrine

In recent years, commentators and scholars have increasingly turned to the work of Carl Schmitt to make sense of Donald Trump’s brand of populist politics. Schmitt, a controversial German legal theorist and critic of liberal democracy, is best known for his assertion that “the political” is founded on the distinction between friend and enemy, and that sovereignty ultimately resides in the ability to decide on the exception. These stark categories and authoritarian leanings have led some to draw parallels between Schmitt’s vision of political order and Trump’s combative, norm-defying presidency. However, such comparisons are often made too hastily and risk misrepresenting both Schmitt’s theoretical rigor and the true nature of Trump’s political conduct.

At first glance, Trump’s rhetoric may seem to mirror Schmitt’s ideas. His vilification of the media, Democratic opponents, and the so-called “deep state” appears to echo Schmitt’s existential enemy concept. Likewise, Trump’s disregard for political norms and his assertion of personal loyalty over institutional duty suggest a preference for strong, centralized authority. Yet, a closer examination reveals that Trump’s politics lack the consistency, ideological commitment, and structural coherence necessary to be meaningfully Schmittian. His enemies are often rhetorical conveniences, and his approach to power is shaped more by performance and media manipulation than by a principled assertion of sovereignty.

Schmitt’s theories were developed in response to a crisis of liberalism in Weimar Germany and were grounded in a philosophical inquiry into the foundations of legal and political authority. In contrast, Trump’s populism is fundamentally reactive, emotionally driven, and tethered to cultural resentment rather than existential threat. While Schmitt saw the enemy as a necessary category to preserve the unity of the political community, Trump employs the language of enemies for mobilization and spectacle, rarely following through with actions that would reflect Schmitt’s decisive sovereign authority. His relationships with political allies and foes are fluid, shifting according to expedience rather than any coherent theory of political necessity.

This essay argues that applying Schmittian concepts to Trump’s populism ultimately obscures more than it reveals. Trump’s political strategy is better understood as a form of cultural combat within a functioning democratic framework, not as a manifestation of Schmittian authoritarianism. The fluidity of his friend-enemy distinctions, his reliance on electoral legitimacy, and his personality-driven leadership style all depart sharply from Schmitt’s theoretical prescriptions. As such, efforts to read Trump through Schmitt’s lens risk distorting both figures and overlooking the unique dynamics of contemporary American populism.

Schmitt’s Friend-Enemy Distinction Is Too Rigid for Trump’s Populism

Carl Schmitt, the German political theorist, famously defined politics through the friend-enemy distinction. According to Schmitt, true political conflicts are existential in nature, necessitating the identification and neutralization of an enemy to preserve political order. This framework underpinned Schmitt’s justification for authoritarian rule, where decisive action and the concentration of power in a sovereign authority were necessary to maintain stability.

Donald Trump’s populism, while confrontational and rhetorically aggressive, does not fit neatly into Schmitt’s rigid dichotomy. Trump often engages in performative hostility, but his alliances and enmities are fluid. Unlike Schmitt’s absolutist view of the enemy, Trump shifts targets based on political convenience. His relationships with figures such as Senator Lindsey Graham, Fox News, and even members of the Republican establishment illustrate this volatility. At times, he demonizes these actors, only to reconcile when politically expedient. This lack of consistency undermines any attempt to categorize Trump’s politics within Schmitt’s strict friend-enemy framework.

Moreover, Schmitt’s notion of the enemy presumes a form of existential conflict requiring definitive resolution, often through extraordinary measures. Trump’s populism, however, operates within the spectacle of modern media and social networks, where enemies serve as foils for mobilization rather than as existential threats requiring elimination. His rhetoric against the “fake news media” or the “deep state” is aggressive, yet it does not translate into a systematic purge or restructuring of political institutions. Instead, his hostilities are largely designed to energize his political base rather than to enact the sort of structural transformations Schmitt might envision.

 Trump’s ‘Enemy’ Category Is More About Cultural Resentment Than Political Elimination

Schmitt’s enemy category was grounded in a theory of sovereignty that demanded decisive action against existential threats to the political order. In contrast, Trump’s conception of the enemy is deeply tied to cultural resentment rather than an imperative for political eradication. His targets, such as the mainstream media, the Democratic Party, or globalist elites, are framed not as immediate existential threats but as symbols of a perceived cultural and economic betrayal.

This distinction is crucial because it highlights the performative nature of Trump’s populism. His rhetoric stokes divisions and solidifies his support base, but it does not translate into decisive political action against his designated foes. While Trump demonizes groups such as immigrants, left-wing activists, and bureaucratic elites, he does not consolidate power in the Schmittian sense of sovereign decision-making. His approach is more akin to cultural warfare, wherein opposition figures are caricatured and ridiculed rather than systematically neutralized.

Furthermore, Trump’s frequent shifts in alliances suggest that his conception of the enemy is instrumental rather than doctrinal. Political figures who oppose him can later become allies, provided they demonstrate loyalty. This contrasts sharply with Schmitt’s more absolute distinction, where the enemy represents an existential opposition to be permanently overcome.

 Schmitt’s Authoritarian Vision Undervalues Trump’s Electoral Strategy

Schmitt favored strong executive rule, often at the expense of democratic processes. His theory of sovereignty emphasized the necessity of a decisive leader who could suspend legal norms in times of crisis. This preference for authoritarianism does not align with Trump’s political strategy, which remains deeply embedded in electoral mobilization and democratic engagement, however polarizing.

Trump’s approach to power relies on mass rallies, social media engagement, and a populist appeal to voters. His political legitimacy is derived from elections and public opinion rather than from an assertion of sovereign authority that disregards democratic mechanisms. Even in his efforts to challenge election results, Trump primarily relied on legal battles and procedural maneuvers rather than outright suspension of constitutional order. Unlike Schmitt’s sovereign, who decides on the exception, Trump’s actions, while norm-defying, still operated within the legal and institutional framework of American democracy.

Additionally, Trump’s populist appeal depends on the notion of direct representation, wherein he presents himself as the authentic voice of the people against corrupt elites. This reliance on electoral validation and mass support runs counter to Schmitt’s disdain for liberal democratic processes, which he viewed as inherently weak and indecisive.

 Trump’s Focus on Personality Clashes with Schmitt’s Institutional Concerns

Schmitt’s political thought revolves around legal and institutional structures. His critique of liberal democracy was not merely about individual leaders but about the systemic weaknesses of its constitutional framework. By contrast, Trump’s political movement is heavily personality-driven, often reducing complex political issues to personal grievances and individual loyalty.

Trump’s appeal is rooted in his persona rather than in a coherent institutional critique. While he frequently attacks institutions such as the judiciary, the FBI, and the media, his criticisms are often inconsistent and based on personal conflicts rather than a structured ideological framework. This lack of institutional focus makes attempts to compare him to Schmitt analytically weak. Schmitt sought to theorize the nature of political authority and legitimacy in the face of crisis, whereas Trump’s approach to power is largely reactive and contingent on personal disputes.

 Schmitt’s Critique of Liberal Democracy Does Not Align with Trump’s Strategy

Schmitt viewed liberal democracy as inherently unstable and believed it required an authoritarian corrective. His vision of governance was one where legal norms could be suspended in favor of decisive action by a sovereign ruler. Trump, while challenging institutions, does not systematically reject liberal democracy. Instead, he operates within its framework, engaging in elections, appointing judges, and leveraging media influence.

Trump’s strategy is not to replace democracy with authoritarian rule but to exploit democratic mechanisms for political gain. His legal challenges to the 2020 election, for instance, were framed within the existing judicial system. He did not attempt to suspend constitutional order but rather sought to manipulate it to his advantage. This is a significant departure from Schmitt’s vision, which emphasized the necessity of transcending legal norms altogether in times of crisis.

 The U.S. Constitution Survived Trump’s Presidency

Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty suggests that crises lead to the suspension of constitutional order, with the sovereign deciding on the state of exception. However, despite Trump’s challenges to democratic norms, the U.S. Constitution remained intact. Institutions functioned, courts ruled against him in election-related cases, and the transfer of power proceeded as prescribed.

Trump’s presidency demonstrated the resilience of American institutions rather than their collapse into Schmittian exceptionalism. Even amid efforts to contest the election, legal mechanisms held firm, and no fundamental constitutional rupture occurred. This outcome further weakens the comparison between Trump and Schmitt’s political vision.

 Trump’s Legal Battles Differ from Schmitt’s Notion of Sovereignty

Schmitt’s sovereign overrides laws during emergencies, asserting authority beyond legal constraints. Trump’s legal conflicts, however, stem from personal and political controversies rather than an assertion of sovereign power. His impeachment trials, lawsuits, and investigations are attempts to evade accountability rather than reframe legal authority.

Trump does not govern as a sovereign in Schmitt’s sense but as a populist figure engaged in constant legal and political battles. His approach to law is adversarial but does not seek to transcend legal frameworks altogether. This distinction is crucial in differentiating his presidency from Schmittian sovereignty.

 Trump’s View of Power Is Opportunistic, Not Theoretically Coherent

Schmitt was an intellectual with a coherent, if dangerous, legal theory. His writings provided a structured critique of liberal democracy and a rationale for authoritarian governance. Trump, by contrast, lacks a consistent theoretical approach to power. His actions are improvisational, reactive, and shaped by immediate political needs rather than by a doctrinal commitment to sovereignty or legal theory.

Attempts to frame Trump within Schmittian concepts fail because Trump’s political style is fundamentally pragmatic and media-driven rather than ideologically rigid. His presidency is better understood through the lens of populism and cultural politics rather than as an application of Schmitt’s authoritarian theories.