Bénéton begins Les Régimes Politiques by emphasizing the importance of defining what constitutes a political regime. For him, a political regime is not merely a set of institutions or legal frameworks; it is a broader system encompassing the organization of power, the principles guiding governance, and the relationship between rulers and the ruled. Bénéton stresses that political regimes must be understood in their entirety, considering their formal structures and the underlying values and ideologies that shape their functioning. This holistic approach allows him to draw meaningful comparisons between different regimes and to assess their strengths and weaknesses more effectively.

Central to Bénéton’s analysis is his classification of political regimes, which he derives from classical political theory. He draws heavily on Aristotle’s typology, categorizing regimes based on who rules and for whose benefit. According to this classification, regimes can be broadly divided into three types: monarchy (rule by one), aristocracy (rule by the few), and polity or democracy (rule by the many). These can degenerate into a corrupt form: tyranny, oligarchy, and mob rule, respectively. Bénéton adopts this framework but adapts it to contemporary political realities, recognizing that modern states rarely fit neatly into these categories and that hybrid regimes are increasingly common.

Bénéton contrasts the political structures outlined by Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Marx with Aristotle’s account of regimes, highlighting the shortcomings of modern approaches and demonstrating Aristotle’s enduring relevance. In seeking to redefine politics in purely pragmatic and amoral terms, Machiavelli dismisses the classical emphasis on the common good and virtue. For Machiavelli, the distinction between just and unjust regimes is irrelevant; the effectiveness of power, secured through force or deceit, is paramount. Bénéton critiques this approach for neglecting the stabilizing role of legitimacy and shared moral values, which Aristotle identified as essential to a well-ordered polis. Unlike Machiavelli’s focus on expediency, Aristotle’s framework insists on aligning political power with justice and the natural order, fostering stable governance through the active consent and virtue of the governed.

Montesquieu’s tripartite classification of regimes—republic, monarchy, and despotism—marks a departure from Aristotle’s nuanced typology that integrates the number of rulers and their orientation toward the common good. While Montesquieu emphasizes the importance of institutional structures and the spirit of laws, Bénéton argues that his analysis lacks the depth of Aristotle’s moral and teleological foundation. Montesquieu focuses on the mechanics of governance and the principles animating different systems, such as virtue in republics and honor in monarchies. Still, he does not address the intrinsic nature of justice and the cultivation of human flourishing as central to political life. By contrast, Aristotle provides a more holistic account, categorizing regimes not merely by their structure but by their alignment with the virtuous development of citizens, thereby situating political life within the broader context of human excellence.

In his critique of political regimes, Marx subordinates politics to economics, reducing regimes to mere instruments of class struggle and modes of production. Bénéton identifies this economic determinism as a fundamental flaw, as it dismisses the autonomy and moral dimensions of political life. Aristotle’s account, by contrast, maintains the primacy of politics as the architectonic science, shaping all other human activities. While Marx envisions the ultimate dissolution of political regimes in a classless society, Aristotle recognizes the perpetual necessity of political structures to mediate human relations and promote the common good. Bénéton concludes that Aristotle’s emphasis on justice, virtue, and the moral purpose of governance offers a superior framework, preserving the intrinsic dignity and complexity of political life in a way that modern theories fail to achieve.

Bénéton critiques the 20th-century behavioral political sciences, as represented by figures like David Easton, Robert Dahl, and Gabriel Almond, for their reductive approach to political regimes. These thinkers prioritize empirical methodologies and systemic generalizations, often modeled on the natural sciences, to analyze political life. Focusing on observable behaviors, patterns, and measurable dynamics reduces regimes to mechanistic frameworks devoid of moral or cultural depth. For example, Easton’s “systems theory” views politics as an input-output process, while Dahl’s pluralist model treats power as dispersed among competing groups, and Almond’s “structural-functionalism” emphasizes universal roles and functions. Bénéton argues that these approaches overlook the qualitative and normative distinctions between regimes, which Aristotle emphasizes as central. Aristotle’s account sees regimes not just as systems of governance but as expressions of ethical and communal life grounded in justice, legitimacy, and the common good—dimensions behavioral political science fails to address.

Moreover, Bénéton critiques the behavioral sciences’ claim to value-neutrality, which he sees as fundamentally flawed and inadequate for understanding political regimes. By striving for objectivity, thinkers like Dahl and Almond flatten the profound distinctions between democratic, oligarchic, and tyrannical regimes, reducing them to variations in institutional structures or distributions of power. This perspective erases the moral and teleological aspects of political life that Aristotle highlights, particularly the idea that regimes aim at specific ends—some noble, others corrupt. For Aristotle, the regime determines the ethical orientation of its citizens and the pursuit of the common good. In contrast, behavioral science, with its descriptive focus, neglects the question of how regimes cultivate or undermine virtue, leaving its analysis ethically impoverished and unable to evaluate the qualitative differences that make one regime superior to another.

Bénéton underscores how the behavioral sciences’ emphasis on systemic regularities and universal patterns fails to grapple with the historical and cultural particularities that shape regimes. Aristotle’s analysis, rooted in the diversity of political life, acknowledges the interplay of historical, ethical, and social factors in determining a regime’s character. For instance, Aristotle differentiates between regimes based on their alignment with justice and their capacity to promote human flourishing, recognizing the profound consequences of these distinctions for civic life, and in its quest for generality, behavioral political science disregards such nuances, treating regimes as interchangeable mechanisms for managing power. Bénéton concludes that while behavioral approaches offer valuable technical insights, they ultimately fall short of Aristotle’s richer and more holistic understanding of regimes as the foundation of communal and ethical life.

Bénéton’s discussion of democracy is remarkably nuanced and insightful. He recognizes democracy as the dominant political regime of the modern era but carefully distinguishes between different forms of democracy. He differentiates between “classical democracy,” which he associates with direct participation by the citizens in the governance process, and “representative democracy,” which is characterized by the election of representatives who make decisions on behalf of the people. Bénéton argues that while representative democracy is the most prevalent form today, it has its challenges and potential pitfalls.

One of the key themes in Bénéton’s analysis of democracy is the tension between “liberty and equality.” He observes that modern democracies are often torn between the desire to promote individual freedoms and the drive to achieve greater social and economic equality. Bénéton states this tension can lead to contradictions and conflicts within democratic societies. For example, policies promoting equality, such as wealth redistribution, may infringe on individual liberties. In contrast, policies prioritizing freedom, such as laissez-faire economic practices, may exacerbate social inequalities. He argues that managing this tension is one of the central challenges for modern democracies and requires carefully balancing competing values.

Bénéton is also critical of what he sees as the “excesses of democratic egalitarianism.” He warns that an overemphasis on equality can lead to a leveling of society that undermines excellence, merit, and the pursuit of the common good. In his view, democracy should not merely focus on ensuring equal outcomes but should also strive to cultivate virtues and promote the well-being of the community as a whole. Bénéton is concerned that contemporary democracies, in their pursuit of equality, may neglect these higher goals and reduce politics to a mere struggle for power and resources. This, he argues, can lead to the erosion of civic virtue and a decline in the quality of public life.

Another critical aspect of Bénéton’s analysis is his exploration of the “moral foundations of political regimes.” He argues that the legitimacy and stability of any political regime depend on its moral and ethical underpinnings. In this regard, Bénéton is mainly concerned with the role of “virtue” in governance. Drawing on classical political philosophy, he contends that a good regime is one that promotes virtue among its citizens and rulers. For Bénéton, virtue is not just a personal quality bujusticet ajustice public good that is essential for the proper functioning of society. He believes that without a commitment to virtue, political regimes will likely become corrupt and degenerate, leading to tyranny or chaos.

Bénéton’s emphasis on virtue leads him to critique modern liberal democracies, which he believes have largely abandoned the pursuit of virtue in favor of “procedural justice” and individual rights. While he acknowledges the importance of these principles, he argues that they are insufficient for sustaining a healthy political community. Bénéton worries that the focus on individual rights and freedoms can lead to a kind of moral relativism, where the pursuit of self-interest takes precedence over the common good. This, he suggests, can result in a fragmented and atomized society where civic engagement and social cohesion are weakened.

In addition to his critique of modern democracy, Bénéton also explores the dynamics of “authoritarian regimes.” He is particularly interested in how these regimes maintain control and legitimacy in the absence of democratic processes. Bénéton argues that authoritarian regimes often rely on a combination of coercion and consent, using propaganda, surveillance, and repression to suppress dissent while also seeking to cultivate a sense of legitimacy through appeals to tradition, nationalism, or ideology. He notes that while authoritarian regimes can achieve stability, they are often brittle and prone to collapse if their sources of legitimacy are undermined.

Bénéton’s analysis of totalitarianism, a particularly extreme form of authoritarianism, contributes significantly to his understanding of political regimes. He identifies totalitarianism as a regime that seeks total control over all aspects of life, including politics, the economy, culture, and even personal beliefs. Bénéton highlights the dangers of totalitarian regimes, particularly their tendency to dehumanize individuals and reduce them to mere instruments of the state. He argues that totalitarianism represents a profound threat to human dignity and freedom and that its emergence is often the result of profound social and political crises that disrupt the normal functioning of democratic institutions.

In Les Régimes Politiques, Bénéton also engages with the concept of “regime change” and the conditions under which political regimes transform. He argues that a combination of internal and external factors, including economic crises, social unrest, wars, and ideological shifts, often drive regime change. Bénéton is particularly interested in how regimes manage or fail to manage these pressures and what this reveals about their strengths and vulnerabilities. He suggests that successful regime change often requires not just the removal of the old regime but the establishment of a new political order that is both legitimate and capable of addressing the underlying causes of the crisis.

Finally, Bénéton concludes his analysis by reflecting on the future of political regimes in the modern world. He is cautiously optimistic about the prospects for democracy but warns that the challenges it faces, particularly the tension between liberty and equality, must be carefully managed. He also emphasizes the importance of cultivating civic virtue and a sense of common purpose in order to sustain democratic governance. Bénéton’s work is a call to political philosophers and practitioners alike to engage deeply with political regimes’ moral and ethical dimensions and seek ways to strengthen the foundations of democratic life.

In conclusion, Philippe Bénéton’s Les Régimes Politiques offers a rich and nuanced exploration of political regimes, drawing on classical political theory while addressing contemporary challenges. Bénéton’s analysis is characterized by its emphasis on the moral and ethical dimensions of governance, particularly the role of virtue in sustaining political order. His critique of modern democracy, focusing on the tension between liberty and equality, provides valuable insights into the challenges facing democratic regimes today. Through his examination of different types of regimes, including authoritarianism and totalitarianism, Bénéton delivers a comprehensive framework for understanding the complexities of political life and the conditions necessary for the success and stability of political regimes.

The post Philippe Bénéton’s Understanding of Political Regimes in Les Régimes Politiques appeared first on The Miskatonian.

Aristotle says that the politeia as a thing not only refers to the ruling part or body (the politeuma) that actually held ruler or control over the given political community but also the very way of life and overall political culture that shapes that given political community. The polis—which was the form of the political community at the time of the Ancient Greeks—was understood to be an aggregation of the various households (oikoi) who shared the same space or territory and in doing so generally shared a common life together as a single community. Thus given the household (oikos) itself was an aggregation of different relationships that are found living within it (i.e., the husband-wife, parent-child, sibling-sibling, and master-slave/servant relationships). The nature of the polis needs to be understood as an aggregation of discrete parts whose only real unity arises out of their common shared life together in that shared space. And the political is the inter-arrangement, structure, or order of which part of the polis rules (that is to say has authority and control) over the whole community and thus to rule for the benefit of the whole community and not merely themselves or their friends and family.

Aristotle at first suggests that the politeia could be understood to be defined by two characteristics—(1) the number of rulers and (2) the justice of the ruler’s rule. As to the characteristic of the number of rulers (1), he presents us with a very common-sense division between the one, the few, or the many. As to the characteristic of the justice of the ruler’s rule (2), it is divided between the rulers ruling for the benefit or utility or good of themselves or for the sake of the whole community. Here Aristotle does not insist as Plato had that justice would require that rulers rule only for the sake of the ruled, but that that they ought to rule for the sake and benefit of the whole community and not some particular part. And if the rulers ruled for their own interest at the sake of the others in the community such rule would resemble in character despotic rule or mastery—which is understood to be rule over slaves/servants where the rule is for the sake of the rulers and not the ruled.

Out of the juxtaposition of these two categories, Aristotle presents the first typology of politeias:

What is interesting in this first typology of politeia is the name given for the politeia of the rule of the many for the common advantage is the same word for the thing he is trying to classify—politeia.  Thus, Aristotle uses the same word to signify one particular type or variety that he uses to label the whole class of things he is trying to describe.  It would be like if he had given a list of species or one of the specie was called specie. 

Aristotle in doing this had many commentators and translators perplexed about what to do with this politeia called politeia.  And using politeia to refer to a specific variety of politeia was rather unique to Aristotle, as neither Thucydides, Hesiod, Xenophon, or Plato did this.  Plato speaks of the timocracy, the rule of the warriors or honor lovers—Aristotle is wholly about such a regime in his Politics.  And because of this most translators and commentators opt to call this particular form of politeia a polity or something like a constitutional rule or a republic (but that would be problematic as the Latin for politeia is res publica).

            Yet right after Aristotle presented this six-fold typology in his Politics, he immediately challenges the validity of this just presented typology by making the claim that what truly defines the nature of an oligarchy is not the fact that its rulers are few but that they are the rich, the wealthy.  He argues that even if the ruling rich or wealthy were many (and the largest and most numerous part—even the majority) and not few its rule would remain oligarchic rather than democratic.   And this is as true about the rule of the poor or the vulgar (the demos)—that if the few poor or vulgar ruled over a political community its rule would be democratic in character.   Thus, the number of rulers seems to be accidental to the character of the given politeia.  What is more important and more critical is what exactly is the group that is ruling—who are they? Are they the wealthy/rich or the poor?  Aristotle suggests that what defines and distinguishes one politeia from another is the claim made by each group on who should rule and why. Thus, each politeia advances a specific claim about the justice and justification of its rule over the political community.  

            At Politics 3.10 Aristotle allows each form of politeia to put forward their individual claim (or justification) to rule.  In this particular presentation, Aristotle only does not let two of the six types of politeia present their claim as the other four are allowed to—one is tyranny and the other the politeia called politeia.   Whereas the claim of tyranny is obvious—might makes right—the claim of the politeia named politeia is not.  And given the very strangeness in its very name—one would expect some clarification would be given—but in Book 3 of the Politics, none is given.  So, at the end we have five claims—four explicitly presented in the text, one only implied and they are the following:

In Politics the claim of justice makes by each politeia seems to be what truly defines it.  Yet where we turn to Politics we not only return to the original six-fold typology of politeia of Politics but we once again see Aristotle drop it with the claim that a politeia with a much more complex one that not only has politeia varying across types but there is also variation within each type as well.  Thus, Aristotle suggests that there is a high degree of variation within a specific form of politeia than there is variance among them. 

            Yet what is shocking in Aristotle’s treatment of politeia in Book 4 is that he focuses more clearly on the politieas of democracy and oligarchy.  He says he has already discussed kingship and aristocracy already and argues that what remains is to discuss what has yet to be discussed from the original six forms of politeia—oligarchy, democracy, politeia called politeia, and tyranny, but what happens is somewhat different than promised. Instead, he spends the first three chapters going once again over what the politeia is and what is it composed of, and then he fleshes out the various parts of multitudes (the many) and notables (the few) that exist within and forms most political communities only then and there to give an account of the variations within the democratic politeia.

            After the account of the variations of the democratic politeia, the next chapter he then presents the variations of the oligarchic politeia.  One would expect for him to now turn to the next politeia—either tyranny or the politeia called politeia—but he does not, rather he represented both the account of the variations of democratic politeias and then oligarchic politeias.  Only after this representation of the variations of democratic (which slightly differs from the earlier account) and oligarchic politeias he then gives a blurred account of both aristocracy (which he said he had already discussed) and the politeia called politeia—which unlike the account of the varieties of democratic and oligarchic politeias does not offer clear cut variations for each he seems to all too often blur them both with either oligarchy or democracy.  These two chapters are some of the most confusing and difficult to read and understand in Aristotle’s Politics and remain an endless source of controversy over what exactly he is trying to argue here remains with us till today.

            It is in this more complex form of the politeia that we just mentioned above that Aristotle clearly distinguishes his teaching from that of Plato and Xenophon, as well as Thucydides and Herodotus. In fact, later writers like Plutarch and Polybius—Greeks who are writing and living at the time after Rome has conquered Greece and ruled over it—speak of the politeia as more akin to Plato than to Aristotle, especially Aristotle’s account of Politics book 4, 5, and 6.  The fact that so little is mentioned of Aristotle’s account about politeia among the Roman and early Christian authors it is commonly believed that these authors either did not bother to read or even have access to Aristotle’s Politics.

            Aristotle’s account of the politeia also fundamentally differs from that of Plato’s and Polybius’s accounts by his underscoring that change of politeia will occur between politeia but also within variations as well.  Both Plato and Polybius have a narrow understanding of politeia and thus present change or politeia as of a cyclical path.  In fact, their use of this cyclical change from one form of politeia to the next, in a particular path from kingship to aristocracy, to timocracy (which for Plato is the rule by the warriors), to oligarchy, to democracy, to tyranny.  This circular motion of the cycle of politeia change is one of the reasons such change of a politeia would be called a revolution.  Hence the power of this cyclical vision of political change.  But Aristotle’s account of this change of one type of politeia was radically at odds with his teacher Plato.  Aristotle held that that change could not only occur from one type to another as well as within type from one variation to other but also that there was no one clear set pattern or cycle that political change of politeia would take.  Aristotle would argue that yes some changes were more likely and others less likely but others changes were possible.  He also argues that the cycle did not necessarily repeat in the way Plato presented it.

When we look at what Aristotle shows us about the way political change can emerge and occur from one form of politeia to another, either a change within or among types, we see that he offers a model of political change that is not only as dynamic as many contemporary models of political systems/regimes, but we also find in today’s social scientific study of politics, what we call political science.  Yet Aristotle’s treatment of politeia differs from most if not all contemporary models found in today’s political science because his approach allows both strong quantitative and qualitative characteristics (not requiring the sacrificing of one for the other that is common in most contemporary approaches) that also are highly empirical in character yet offering great prescriptive richness that much empirical political typically lacks.

The post Aristotle on the politeia and its role in his political science. appeared first on The Miskatonian.