Michel Serres, Atlas

“There are no fixtures in nature. The universe is fluid and volatile. Permanence is but a word of degrees.

Our globe seen by God is a transparent law, not a mass of facts.

The law dissolves the fact and holds it fluid.”

Ralph Waldo Emerson, “Circles”

“Wonder and grief together have their ground in matter and material-corporeal perception.

Through the senses, I perceive both the wonderous beauty of the Reef and its fragility.”

Anne Elvey, Reading With Earth”

This essay explores “fragility” as a central concept in Michel Serres’s work and key feminist new materialist perspectives on human and nonhuman agency. The concept of fragility encourages us to engage with notions of potentiality, indeterminacy, fluidity, and vulnerability while recognizing the co-constitution and mutual entanglement of human and nonhuman agents. It resonates powerfully with ethico-political perspectives in the context of the Anthropocene. A prominent theme in both Serres’s work and feminist new materialist thought is the critique of humanity’s ecocidal-parasitic tendencies and the recognition of fragilities, alongside a strong emphasis on the interconnectedness of human and nonhuman agents. Their delicate connections are always on the verge of transformation and reconfiguration, forming part of an ongoing onto-epistemological process of co-creation –what Haraway describes as a “making-with.” This is, by nature, a fragile process—open to both discord and harmony, continually reshaped by past and future practices and narratives.

In this co-agential existence and interconnected web of life, Serres suggests that humans, as parasites, live within and alongside flora and fauna, parasitizing each other while coexisting with the parasites that make up their environment –humans also live within the “black box”, as the collective or society in the form of an animal (Leviathan): “We are certainly within something bestial … Our host? I don’t know. But I do know that we are within.”[1] Serres suggests that we are deeply embedded within something vast and bestial, though we may not fully understand our host. The host is what we create and what creates us.

Our “nature cultures” (Haraway) are comprised of the inseparable blend of nature (as the stage) and history/culture (as the play). There is no exit from this twofold existence; our stories and actions take place entirely within these intertwined realms, with no absolute external position. Reinforcing the idea that there is no direct, unproblematic separation between the natural and the cultural, Karen Barad writes that “There are only ‘acts of nature.’” Similarly, Vicki Kirby’s revision of Derrida’s “There is no outside of text” to “There is no outside of nature” does not privilege nature but acknowledges that “there is no outside, no remainder that is not already involved and evolving as text.”[2] Being eternally within, we are responsible for our actions and connections; and this highlights the dimension of our accountability as ethical modalities. In this context, being accountable entails acknowledging how and through which acts we leave “marks on bodies.”[3] This entails a deliberate recognition or adoption of a fragile subject position, or more precisely, a conscious openness to the material realities of both human and more-than-human life, as well as to the consequences of our choices and actions.

The Fragile Being

Serres affirms the fragile in the face of everything solid, rigid, archaic, and frozen.[4] Fragility is the readiness to change or disappear. Life and thought are marked by fragility, as they “live in closest proximity to nothingness.”[5] Humanity, “the mother of all weakness,”[6] is fragile. The fragile being is weak, frail, and exposed. Yet, it is potent and productive, it can mix, confuse, and evolve: “Any evolution can only be born of fragility,” writes Serres.[7] This potentiality is a persistent memory that flows with time rather than resisting it.

The fragile being is strong precisely because it is ready to cease existing as such, in that form, in that sense, in that moment: It is closeness to be otherwise, always on the edge of becoming something else. Whether it is human, animal, or plant, the fragile being is a “memory-thing”[8] carrying the essence of transformation. It bears traces and marks of histories of entanglements. It is a form shifter, an implication of a certain past and a certain future. It represents newness, like that of infancy and growth—an immanence unfolding within nature, which is inherently fragile and vulnerable, “ready to fade away with the first breath of wind. Ready to vanish, to return to nothingness. Nature is born, is going to be born, gets ready to be born, like a fragile infant.”[9] Fragility is also a striking feature of Serres’s philosophical practice which encompasses elements of frailty, sensitivity, and fluidity. When Latour asks whether he is seeking “a synthesis of fragility,” Serres responds,

What I seek to form, to compose, to promote –I can’t quite find the right word– is a syrrhèse, a confluence not a system, a mobile confluence of fluxes … An assembly of relations … Once again, the flames’ dance. The living body dances like that, and all life. Weakness and fragility mark the spot of their most precious secret. I seek to assist the birth of an infant.[10]

This can be described as “a construction at the limits of fragility”[11] –a gentle philosophy of connecting, confusing, mixing, bending that recognizes spaces of material relations and “spaces of non-law, where nature can get through.”[12] It views limits and boundaries as fluid, indistinct, and open.

Fragility is inherent in rigidity, as even the most rigid structures are always fragile—yet fragility transcends conceptual rigidity. It embraces an irreducible ontological excess, challenging dominant discourses with its bold closeness to nothingness.

Fragile States of Subject and Object

Serres, in Natural Contract, acknowledges the fragility of human agency and mastery, proposing an anti-reductionist treatment of nature, which “behaves as a subject.”[13] The social contract theory, brutally transitioning from nature to culture, led to the world’s disappearance while “self-important men are left with their history and their reason.”[14] Nature encompasses all conditions of human nature, providing shelter and food, but it reacts and takes them away when we abuse them; and  behaving as a subject, it “speaks to us in terms of forces, bonds, and interactions.”[15] Following Vicki Kirby, we can describe this “Subject Nature” as a “literate, numerate and social” nature within which “the exceptional status and identity of the human is one of quantum dis/location.”[16] This view of Subject Nature highlights the mutual implication and entanglement of humans and nonhumans and helps to problematize what Sloterdijk calls “the old ecology of stage and play”[17] –the view of nature as an absolute, mute, passive supplier of resources, which belongs to the Cartesian/modernist anthropocentric imaginary. Sloterdijk associates fragility with historicity, which, for civilizations, means mortality.[18] In the Anthropocene, nature as the old stage or background of human action has shed its traditional role as the backdrop for human activity, revealing its fragility and demanding recognition of its limits.[19] Serres’s idea of a Natural Contract recognizes this fragility, appearing as what we humans owe to nature, a legal subjectivity, a ground for reciprocity and symbiosis: “a gift that could allow nonhuman lives to flourish by simply being allowed to be without subjugation,”[20] as Patricia MacCormack explains.

Serres’s problematization of subject-object positions reveals the abrasiveness of the discursive culture of Anthropos that repeats practices of human mastery and sameness: “the parasite takes all and gives nothing; the host gives all and takes nothing. Rights of mastery and property come down to parasitism.”[21] The view of human agency as “an umbilical, non-metaphorical yardstick of all other claims to agency,”[22]  maintained the violent dichotomy of active subject-passive object. This is the discourse of the Selfsame which is a “history of an identity,” of “phallocentrism and propriation.”[23]

Identity, however, is not static; it is fluid, evolving, queer and multifaceted. For Karen Barad, identity is not an isolated concept but a phenomenal matter, inherently multiple and constantly shifting within itself –it is a process of “diffraction / différance / differing / deferring / differentiating,” where an atom’s identity is always subject to reworkings, shaped by both past and future interactions.[24] Michel Serres shares a similar view. As David Webb explains, Serres sees material order as the formation of a code where atoms do not follow predetermined laws but rather form their own codes as they combine.[25] This perspective highlights the relational and dynamic nature of identity, viewing it as an ongoing process of differentiation.

The ambiguity of subject-object positions exposes the fragility of the boundaries that shape identity and divide agencies. As such, beyond the context of the one-directional, parasitic relationship between subject and object, human agency can be viewed as just one form of agency that involves “receiving, storing, processing and emitting information.”[26] The isomorphic participation of both humans and nonhumans in these processes highlights that agency is not exclusive to humans.

Fragility and Indeterminacy

The substitution and interchangeability of subject-object positions demonstrate the operation of indeterminacy. Exploring indeterminacy through Barad’s agential realist account can be productive. In agential realism, indeterminacy marks the basic ontological mode. Phenomena are “ontologically primitive relations” and “the ontological inseparability / entanglement of intra-acting ‘agencies.’”[27] Unlike a Cartesian cut (subject and object), an intra-action (rather than an “interaction” which assumes pre-given relata) forms an agential cut and “enacts a resolution within the phenomenon of the inherent ontological (and semantic) indeterminacy.”[28] Agential separability takes place as “the local condition of exteriority-within-phenomena”[29] –thus, “differentiating is not a relation of radical exteriority, but of agential separability, of exteriority-within.”[30] With the agential realist understanding of agency, Barad challenges the “classical ontological condition of exteriority between observer and observed.”[31] This classical ontological condition, which is replaced by agential separability, can be viewed as the old onto-epistemological mode of what Serres calls “the old agency of the ‘I’” which, encountering the multiple voices of the universe, shatters like a “fragile vase,” with its explosion leading to the formation of “an exterior with any interior”:

The universal flood of noise –sounds, music, and discourse mixed together, presto e fortissimo, erasing the silence– destroys the old agency of the “I,” the way a thin and fragile vase would explode by dint of vibrations, to the profit of transparency thrown towards the perpetual present, forming an exterior with any interior, weaving relations without reserving any substance for itself, sparkling multiplicities without any nucleus. Formerly a dense seed or dark bit of gravel, single and hard, the self becomes multiple, criss-crossed, mosaic, and shimmering.[32]

All forms of agency participate and intra-act within the material-discursive continuum, the spacetimemattering. In the inseparable, co-constitutive relationship of space, time, and matter—emerging through ongoing intra-actions—agency is understood as a process of “doing” or “being,” reflecting the continuous reconfigurations of the world.[33] This onto-epistemological perspective challenges the traditional subject-object binary. As Jane Bennett suggests, entities are neither strictly subject nor object but rather a “mode” of what Spinoza referred to as “Deus sive Natura” (God or Nature).[34] Bennett views the agency as collaborative and distributed: no single actant operates in isolation. She emphasizes that agency changes when nonhuman entities are recognized not as mere social constructs but as actors in their own right and when humans are understood not as autonomous beings but as vital materialities.[35] The agency is dynamic, relational, and process-driven, composed of delicate entanglements that require creative exploration. (As Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman note, we must develop ways to grasp the agency, significance, and transformative power of the world.[36]) A non-hierarchical view of agency calls for moving beyond reductive thinking that privileges human agency, instead engaging with responsible material-discursive practices that reflect a commitment to understanding how the boundaries and divisions we create hold meaning –a commitment “to understand how different cuts matter.”[37] This view of agency aligns with Rosi Braidotti’s notion of ethico-political subjectivity which she focuses on in her critical posthumanist framework. According to Braidotti, agency is not the sole privilege of Anthropos, and the knowing subject is not just Man but a complex assemblage that transcends the boundaries between self and other: “subjects are embodied and embedded, relational and affective collaborative entities, activated by relational ethics.”[38] This perspective, where agents intra-act through fluid assemblages, suggests a fluid subject position. As Iris Van Der Tuin points out, such a position challenges the dominant discourses of malestream society and identity-based feminisms.[39]

The fluidity of subject-object positions does not imply ambiguous ethical positions, but rather, indeterminacy acquires a founding ethical gesture pertaining to material reality. As Barad writes, “The existence of indeterminacies does not mean that there are no facts, no histories, no bleeding –on the contrary, indeterminacies are constitutive of the very materiality of being.”[40] In this context, indeterminacy can be seen as the ethico-onto-epistemological characteristic of fragile agency, perpetually open to reconfigurations and transformations, operating within fluid and shifting boundaries.

It could be argued that the absence of fixed boundaries suggests a “negative” space of indeterminacy, perceived as emptiness or ambiguity, which can be understood through Serres’s parasitical paradigm:

It might be dangerous not to decide who is the host and who is the guest, who gives and who receives, who is the parasite and who is the table d’hôte, who has the gift and who has the loss, and where hostility begins within hospitality. Who hasn’t trembled with fear in a shady hotel? Shady, obscure, badly lit.[41]

It is important to note that Barad’s account on indeterminacy highlights the ethical implications of boundary-making practices that allocate status, position, or identity. This approach steers clear of the shady, obscure, and fear-inducing aspects of negative indeterminacy described by Serres.

Fragile Sympoiesis

Agency is a matter of “making–with”[42] the earth of Cthulucene. Harawayian sympoiesis accommodates entanglements, complexities, and multiplicities. “Nothing makes itself. Nothing is really autopoietic or self–organizing … earthlings are never alone … Sympoiesis is a word proper to complex, dynamic, responsive, situated, historical systems. It is a word for worlding-with, in company.”[43] As Anne Elvey writes, forest systems, fungi, trees, and animals engage in material entanglements as co-agents, beyond species hierarchy, with an act of sympoiesis, where creatures co-create one another and their environment.[44]

Serresian agency can be described as sympoietic, a soft and dynamic web of entanglements. The “chain of life,”[45] the dance of agents, human and nonhuman, is fragile: a “soft chain, easily cut, fragments easily replaced, a chain almost always broken.”[46] The agential chain is potent and productive within the intricate web of mattering. Understanding agency as a relational and processual making-with leads to the onto-epistemological decentralization of the human agent. Serres calls to “forget the word environment … It assumes that we humans are at the center of a system of nature. This idea recalls a bygone era when the Earth… reflected our narcissism, the humanism that makes of us the exact midpoint or excellent culmination of all things.”[47] Decentralization of the human agent does not mean its dismissal or elimination. This engagement rather draws attention to how ethico-onto-epistemological boundaries are produced and maintained. In this regard, Barad’s focus on a starting point for an analysis of agency is insightful, as its focus is “the practices of differentiating,”[48] –the cuts that divide human and nonhuman.

For Serres, the view of “active subject–passive object” ironically passivizes humans, turning them into slaves in their passion for dominance –thus, we must aim towards a philosophy of nature that “restores the dignity of these memory-things, which we always forget.”[49] The dynamic relationality of agencies reveals the need for knowledge production that does not objectify or reduce, reminding that “the act of knowledge doesn’t link an active subject-pole to an other, a passive object, but rather both participate together in this act in which the games are shared.”[50] The act in which the games are shared is an agential making-with. The subject and object, material and semiotic, natural and social, are never separate.

In the context of the natural and the social, this relationality can be understood through Nancy Tuana’s concept of “viscous porosity.” Exploring how a natural phenomenon occurs with the interactional web of human social structures and practices, Tuana describes Hurricane Katrina as a phenomenon that demonstrates the viscous porosity between the social and the natural.

Material agency in its heterogeneous forms, including irreducibly diverse forms of distinctively human agency, interact in complex ways. Agency in all these instances emerges out of such interactions; it is not antecedent to them. Our epistemic practices must thus be attuned to this manifold agency and emergent interplay, which means we cannot be epistemically responsible and divide the humanities from the sciences or the study of culture from the study of nature.[51]

Tuana emphasizes how natural and social, human and more-than-human are entangled within complex material-semiotic networks, arguing for “interactionism” as a metaphysics that recognizes and acknowledges entangled agencies, while also highlighting the need for making distinctions for distributive justice.

Fragility and Material Vulnerability

 Like Barad, who echoes Levinasian ethics in their practice of ethico-onto-epistemology, Anne Elvey—also drawing on Levinasian philosophy through an ecological feminist materialist hermeneutics—emphasizes the material vulnerability that “shares the character of the ‘face’ that calls.”[52] We witness the shared vulnerability of humans and more-than-human on the “animals left as roadkill, mountains leveled for coal, forests razed for paper products and bodies subject to nuclear fallout”[53], and this witnessing entails “compassionate action as an ethical response.”[54] An act of compassion involves “cross-species and material agencies at work … its fleshy solidarities and resistances.”[55] Formed by senses and the body, compassion implies the body as ground: Elvey refers to the etymological links (in Hebrew and koine Greek) between compassion, maternal, and the corporeal.[56] This emphasis on the materiality of compassion opens space for recognizing human and nonhuman fragilities and for gentle hermeneutics. Via accepting fragilities of all agents, subjects acknowledge and accept their own fragilities. This acceptance is an act of gentleness – “a higher degree of compassion,”[57] as Anne Dufourmantelle puts it, a power of “secret life-giving transformation linked to what the ancients called ‘potentiality’ [puissance]”[58] and “an intelligence, one that carries life, that saves and enhances it.”[59] Only with gentleness is there the possibility for life to grow and transform. This generative, life-giving gentleness as potentiality is similar to Serres’s conception of fragility as a force that makes evolution possible.

In material ethics, as Alaimo and Hekman explain, the emphasis is on ethical practices rather than ethical principles. These practices involve an “openness to the needs, the significance, and the liveliness of the more-than-human world.”[60] Ethical actions arise from material realities, taking place within the relationality of material existence and recognizing the shared impact of co-agency. As human subjects, only by recognizing our fragility and willfully occupying a fragile subject position can we engage in a form of knowing and ethical practice that sees the limitations, boundaries, and constraints that shape our co-agential relationships. This can allow us to confront the inhuman within ourselves and move forward with compassion toward all beings.

The most vital aspect of existence is the fragile. It is the delicate tissue that Serres celebrates: “Here is the living: tissues, young and aged, bent, fused together.”[61] The tissue is “hesitated between fluid and solid,”[62] an intermediate material, fragile and supple, “pliable, tearable, stretchable … topological.”[63] Tissue is fluid and solid, thick and thin, opaque and transparent, participating in multiple states and modes simultaneously. It is connective as placenta which is described by Braidotti as “a state of pacifist cooperation and co-creation between organisms, in a specific relational frame that facilitates their co-existence, interaction and growth.”[64] Placenta politics emphasizes our co-existence and shared materiality. There is a moment of pacifist encounter implied by the materiality of the placenta. It is a space and state of compassion, facilitating co-subjectivity that traverses intersubjectivity. According to Elvey, compassion isn’t just about a direct connection between two individuals, like an injured animal and me in a moment; instead, compassion arises from and reinforces the interconnectedness of all life, emphasizing our shared ethical responsibility as part of the larger fabric of the world.[65] The placenta emerges from the very materiality of ethical reality that posits the human as an agential part of material-discursive becoming as we participate in the differentiating of the world. Ethical practices take place within; they are co-agential, a sympoiesis, and the making-with of agents. As Barad puts it,

Ethics cannot be about responding to the other as if the other is the radical outside to the self. Ethics is not a geometrical calculation; “others” are never very far from “us”; “they” and “we” are co-constituted and entangled through the very cuts “we” help to enact. Intra-actions cut “things” together and apart. Cuts are not enacted from the outside, nor are they ever enacted once and for all.[66]

For Barad, objectivity is “about being accountable and responsible to what is real.”[67] The “real,” in this sense, amounts to what Elvey defines as “the reality of a material givenness that encompasses not only bodies … but also the relatedness that is an ethical reality.”[68] According to Elvey, an ecological feminism shaped around this reality provides the ground for practices of compassion understood as shared vulnerability that allows us “to feel in our bodies the structures of oppression that rely on the dead bodies of animals, including humans, structures for which trauma is constitutive rather than accidental.”[69]

The stories of our agential cuts capture the cumulative narratives shaped by choices and actions. Agential cuts form the boundaries and meanings and require being accountable for the apparatuses that determine them. Haraway’s multispecies storytelling embodies and conveys “complex histories that are as full of dying as living, as full of endings, even genocides, as beginnings.”[70]

As we produce, participate in, or suffer from eco-political devastation, traumatic events, violent discourses, and the political spectacle of false antagonisms, human existence can feel like the shady, obscure, badly lit hotel room Serres describes. Yet, perhaps escape may be possible through a willingness and openness that allow us to perceive openings—perhaps the “spaces of non-law” Serres speaks of, where nature can seep through. These openings, as well as our willingness, are marked by the kind of porosity Serres associates with audacity –a defining quality of the frail.

To inhabit fragility, or a fragile position, is to forge subversive connections that challenge the status quo—provoking, unsettling, and complicating, all while confronting the risk of death. Yet, for the fragile, the ever-looming shadow of death is a familiar companion, making it most alive precisely because it is always ready to fade away, disappear, and return to nothingness.

The most alive is the fragile.

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[1] Michel Serres, The Parasite, trans. Lawrence R. Schehr (University of Minnesota, 2007), 10.

[2] Vicki Kirby, “Matter out of Place: ‘New Materialism’ in Review,” What if Culture was Nature all Along?, ed. Vicki Kirby (Edinburgh University Press, 2017), p. ix.

[3] Karen Barad, “Nature’s Queer Performativity”, Kvinder, Køn & Forskning, (1-2), 2012, 47, https://doi.org/10.7146/kkf.v0i1-2.28067.

[4] Michel Serres and Bruno Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time – Michel Serres with Bruno Latour, trans. Roxanne Lapidus (The University of Michigan Press, 1995), 122.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Michel Serres, The Natural Contract, trans. Elizabeth MacArthur and William Paulson (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 70.

[8] Michel Serres, The Incandescent, trans. Randolph Burks (Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 33.

[9] Serres and Latour, Conversations, 122.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., 120.

[12] Serres, Natural Contract, 70.

[13] Ibid., 36.

[14] Ibid., 35.

[15] Ibid., 39.

[16] Kirby, “Matter out of Place”, ix.

[17] Sloterdijk, Infinite Mobilization, Towards a Critique of Political Kinetics, trans. Sandra Berjan (Polity Press, 2020), 143.

[18] Peter Sloterdijk, After God, trans. Ian Alexander Moore (Polity Press, 2020), 2.

[19] Sloterdijk, Infinite Mobilization, 143.

[20] Patricia MacCormack, “The Grace of Extinction,” Michel Serres and The Crises of The Contemporary, ed. Rick Dolphijn (Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 166.

[21] Serres, Natural Contract, 38.

[22] Christopher Watkin, Michel Serres, Figures of Thought (Edinburgh University Press, 2020), 311.

[23] Hélène Cixous and Catherine Clément, The Newly Born Woman, trans. Betsy Wing (University of Minnesota Press, 1986), 79.

[24] Barad, “Nature’s Queer Performativity,” 32.

[25] David Webb, “The Virtue of Sensibility,” Michel Serres and The Crises of the Contemporary, edited by Rick Dolphijn (Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 21.

[26] Watkin, Figures of Thought, 391.

[27] Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 139.

[28] Ibid., 140.

[29] Barad, “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter,” Signs, Vol. 28, No. 3, Gender and Science: New Issues (Spring 2003): 801-831, https://doi.org/10.1086/345321815, 815.

[30] Barad, “Nature’s Queer Performativity,” 815.

[31] Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 140.

[32] Michel Serres, Hominescence, trans. Randolph Burks (Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 266.

[33] Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 178.

[34] Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Duke University Press, 2010), 22.

[35] Ibid., 21.

[36] Stacey Alaimo and Susan Hekman, “Introduction: Emerging Models of Materiality in Feminist Theory,” Material Feminisms, ed. Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman (Indiana University Press, 2008), 5.

[37] Barad, “Nature’s Queer Performativity,” 46.

[38] Rosi Braidotti, Posthuman Knowledge (Polity Press, 2019), chap 2, Epub, 98.

[39] Iris van der Tuin, Generational Feminism, New Materialist Introduction to a Generative Approach (Lexington Books, 2015), 7.

[40] Karen Barad, “Diffracting Diffraction: Cutting Together-Apart,” July 2014, Parallax Vol. 20, No. 3, https://doi.org/10.1080/13534645.2014.927623

[41] Michel Serres, The Parasite, trans. Lawrence R. Schehr (University of Minnesota, 2007), 15-6.

[42] Donna Haraway, Staying with the Trouble – Making Kin in the Chthulucene, (Duke University Press, 2016), 58.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Anne Elvey, Reading With Earth, Contributions of the New Materialism to an Ecological Feminist Hermeneutics (Bloomsbury, 2022), 151.

[45] Michel Serres, Genesis, trans. Genevieve James and James Nielson (University of Michigan Press, 1995), 72.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Serres, The Natural Contract, 33.

[48] Barad, “Nature’s Queer Peformativity,” 31.

[49] Serres, The Incandescent, 33.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Nancy Tuana, “Viscous Porosity: Witnessing Katrina,” Material Feminisms, eds. Stacy Alaimo and Susan Hekman (Indiana University Press, 2008), 196.

[52] Elvey, Reading With Earth, 141.

[53] Ibid.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Ibid., 153.

[56] Ibid., 147.

[57] Anne Dufourmantelle, Power of Gentleness, Meditations on the Risk of Living, trans. Katherine Payne and Vincent Sallé (New York: Fordham University Press, 2018), 13.

[58] Dufourmantelle, Power of Gentleness, 6.

[59] Ibid., 14.

[60] Alaimo and Hekman, “Introduction: Emerging Models of Materiality in Feminist Theory,” 8.

[61] Michel Serres, Atlas, unpublished manuscript, trans. Randolph Burks and Anthony Uhlmann, 2021, 22, https://www.academia.edu/44930768/Atlas_by_Michel_Serres_Translated_by_Randolph_Burks_and_Anthony_Uhlmann

[62] Ibid., 21.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Rosi Braidotti, “Placenta Politics,” Posthuman Glossary, eds. Rosi Braidotti and Maria Hlavajova (Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 316.

[65] Elvey, Reading with Earth, 147.

[66] Barad, Meeting The Universe Halfway, 178-9.

[67] Ibid., 340.

[68] Elvey, Reading with Earth, 149.

[69] Ibid.

[70] Haraway, Staying with the Trouble, 10.

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Introduction

Engaging with various happenings and events can vividly reveal the body’s reactions, such as inexplicable fear, anger, curiosity, magnetism, shock, or bliss. Maintaining awareness during these moments allows us to observe how external events influence the body, setting the stage for emotional reactions. Throughout our lives, we label these experiences as good or bad, storing them in our subconscious and memory. Consequently, the body becomes conditioned to respond to external stimuli in specific ways, often without our conscious awareness. As I discussed in my previous paper, the body is akin to a muscle that can be trained in different directions. The primary question that arises is: who is in control? Before delving further into this question, let us turn our attention to the emotional body.

Psychophysiology of Emotions

The intricate connection between the body and brain ensures our adaptive responses to the ever-changing environmental landscape. At the heart of this dynamic relationship lies psychophysiology, a field devoted to uncovering how our physiological processes underpin emotional and social experiences. Through the lens of psychophysiological methods, we gain profound insights into the symbiotic relationship between body and mind, emphasizing the body’s indispensable role in our emotional life.

The body and brain operate in concert to manage the myriad stimuli we encounter daily. The brain, as the processing hub, assesses sensory information’s significance and triggers corresponding physiological responses. Consider the amygdala, the brain’s sentinel for emotional processing, which activates the hypothalamus in the face of threat. This initiates the fight-or-flight response, releasing adrenaline, increasing heart rate, and heightening alertness—all preparing the body to confront or escape danger.

Employing psychophysiological methods reveals the nuanced ways these processes unfold. Techniques such as electroencephalography (EEG) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) allow researchers to observe brain activity related to emotion regulation. Peripheral measures like heart rate variability (HRV), skin conductance, and muscle tension further elucidate the body’s response to emotional stimuli. By correlating these physiological measures with subjective emotional experiences, we map the intricate interplay between brain and body.

These methods illuminate the physiological foundations of our emotional and social processes. For instance, HRV serves as a key indicator of the autonomic nervous system’s capacity to manage stress. Higher HRV signifies better emotional regulation and resilience, reflecting a harmonious balance between the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems. Similarly, variations in skin conductance mirror changes in emotional arousal, providing a window into our reactions to social interactions and environmental cues.

Emotions are not confined to the brain; they are embodied experiences manifesting through physiological changes. Joy, for instance, may increase heart rate, relax muscles, and evoke a sense of warmth. Sadness, conversely, may lead to a slower heart rate, muscle tension, and a feeling of heaviness. These physical manifestations of emotion underscore the body’s integral role in our emotional landscape.

Emotions serve adaptive functions, guiding our behavior in ways that enhance survival and well-being. Fear prompts avoidance of danger, anger motivates confrontation, and happiness reinforces behaviors that foster social bonding and cooperation. The psychophysiology of emotions reveals that these responses are not mere automatic reactions but finely tuned mechanisms shaped by evolution to optimize our interaction with the environment.

By delving into the psychophysiology of emotions, we unearth the profound interconnectedness of body and mind, uncovering the embodied nature of our emotional experiences. This exploration affirms that our physiological states are not mere backdrops but active participants in the emotional and social tapestry of human existence.

Yet, it would be a fallacy to assert that our emotions are solely influenced by external stimuli. I might fear a stranger, having never met them before, without any apparent psychological rationale, and be correct in sensing their danger. Conversely, I might harbor an ego-driven hatred for someone simply because they evoke memories of childhood trauma. Let us examine these examples more closely.

Moral Emotions and Behavior

The nexus between emotions such as shame, guilt, empathy, and moral behavior offers profound insights into the human condition. These moral emotions, far from being mere reactions, are intricately shaped by our cognitive processes and the workings of the ego. They serve as internal compasses, guiding our responses to moral and ethical situations.

Shame and guilt, for instance, are powerful emotions that compel introspection and self-evaluation. Shame arises when we perceive ourselves as failing to meet societal or personal standards, leading to a sense of worthlessness or exposure. Guilt, on the other hand, stems from specific actions that violate our moral code, prompting feelings of remorse and a desire to make amends. Both emotions are deeply tied to our sense of self and our awareness of others’ perceptions, highlighting the ego’s role in moral functioning.

Empathy, by contrast, involves the capacity to vicariously experience and understand the emotions of others. It is a cornerstone of prosocial behavior, fostering connections and ethical interactions. Empathy requires cognitive processes that enable perspective-taking and emotional resonance, allowing us to feel concern for others’ well-being and to act in morally appropriate ways.

These emotions—shame, guilt, and empathy—are not merely spontaneous reactions but are cultivated through our cognitive frameworks and egoic structures. They influence how we navigate moral landscapes, prompting actions that align with our ethical beliefs and societal norms. As Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek (2007) elucidate, these emotions are integral to our moral behavior, shaping our interactions and guiding us toward moral integrity.

In understanding moral emotions, we recognize the profound interplay between our cognitive faculties, ego, and emotional responses. This interplay underscores the complexity of moral behavior, revealing how our inner world of emotions and thoughts directs our outer actions in the realm of ethics and morality.

Thus, the perception of emotions is not a unidirectional process but rather a complex interplay where facial and bodily expressions exert reciprocal influence. This dynamic interaction is mediated by cognitive processes that provide context, highlighting the intricate ways in which our mental interpretations shape our emotional experiences.

When we perceive emotions in others, our understanding is guided by the synchronization of facial expressions and bodily cues. A smile paired with relaxed posture conveys happiness more convincingly than a smile alone. Conversely, a frown combined with tense body language accentuates the perception of distress or anger. This bidirectional flow ensures that our emotional perception is nuanced and contextually accurate.

Cognitive processes play a crucial role in this interplay, as they help us interpret and integrate these visual cues. Our mental framework, shaped by past experiences and cultural norms, provides the context necessary for decoding these signals. This contextualization allows us to perceive emotions not as isolated phenomena but as part of a broader, interconnected emotional landscape.

This reciprocal influence underscores the importance of context in emotional perception. Our brains do not simply process facial and bodily expressions in isolation; they integrate these cues with our cognitive understanding of the situation, thereby constructing a coherent emotional experience. This bidirectional flow demonstrates how our mental interpretations can profoundly shape our emotional realities, leading to a deeper understanding of the emotions we perceive in ourselves and others. Does this suggest that we might be overinterpreting our surroundings, attributing excessive significance to them?

Our physical form is not merely a vessel but an active participant in the symphony of social and emotional interactions, embodying and communicating our innermost experiences.

In the realm of social behavior, the body conveys a wealth of information through gestures, posture, and facial expressions. These non-verbal cues often speak louder than words, revealing our true emotions and intentions. A bowed head can signify shame, a clenched fist may denote anger, and a warm smile can express genuine affection. These physical manifestations are crucial for effective communication, as they help us navigate the complex terrain of human interactions, fostering understanding and connection. Psychologically, the body’s responses are intertwined with our emotional states. The bodily reactions are not just reflections of our emotions but integral components of our psychological experiences, reinforcing and amplifying what we feel.

Reflecting on the communicative behavior of the body, I wonder if nature “speaks” in a similar manner. Perhaps we lack the social and empathetic awareness to comprehend its language.

However, I wish to distinguish feelings from emotions, as we frequently conflate the deeper dynamics within the body with egoic emotional reactions. Existential feelings serve as a prime example of this distinction.

Existential Feelings

Existential feelings, distinct from emotional feelings, encompass sensations of homeliness, belonging, and the profound sense of being part of something greater. These feelings are not merely transient emotions but foundational aspects of our existence that shape our perception of reality and our sense of being in the world.

Unlike emotional feelings, which often arise in response to specific stimuli and are relatively fleeting, existential feelings permeate our consciousness, influencing how we experience and interpret our surroundings on a fundamental level. For instance, the feeling of homeliness imbues our environment with familiarity and comfort, anchoring us in a space where we feel safe and at ease. This sense of homeliness extends beyond the physical space, embedding itself in our interactions and daily experiences, providing a backdrop of stability.

Belonging, another crucial existential feeling, involves a deep-rooted sense of connection to others and to a community. This feeling transcends mere social interactions; it is a profound recognition of shared existence and mutual understanding. When we feel we belong, we perceive ourselves as integral parts of a larger whole, enhancing our sense of purpose and grounding us in a collective reality.

Being part of something greater also constitutes an essential existential feeling. It reflects our awareness of our place within a broader context—be it a community, a movement, or the universe itself. This feeling can evoke a sense of awe and wonder, reinforcing our connection to the world and imbuing our lives with meaning and significance.

According to Ratcliffe (2005), these existential feelings are integral to our sense of being in the world. They shape our reality at a foundational level, influencing how we engage with and interpret our experiences. By grounding us in a sense of place, connection, and purpose, existential feelings form the bedrock of our perception, coloring every aspect of our lived experience.

In exploring existential feelings, we delve into the core of our existence, uncovering the profound ways in which our sense of being is intertwined with our perception of reality. These feelings are not mere reactions to our environment but are intrinsic to how we inhabit the world, guiding our interactions and shaping our understanding of life itself.

To move beyond the limitations imposed by our mental constructs, it is essential to recognize the significance of this distinction. Our habitual overthinking leads us to shape the world through the lens of our cognitive biases and emotions. In doing so, we do not merely perceive emotions but, in a sense, we bring them into existence as part of the world we mentally construct.

This prompts us to question whether we can truly rely on our mental and emotional bodies or whether we might shift our attention completely to the physical and sensory aspects of our being. In my view, there exists another body, a guiding presence that acts as a captain, choosing which dimension of experience to attend to. Psychologists often attribute unexplained phenomena to the subconscious, much like Columbus mistakenly named every new land he encountered India. It is crucial that we delve deeper into this subject in the final section of constructing “Mapping the Multifaceted Human Being.”

Conclusion

In conclusion, this exploration affirms the indispensable role of the body in our emotional and existential lives, revealing it as more than a passive container of our being. The study of psychophysiology highlights the body’s active involvement in emotional processing, while the examination of existential feelings unveils the deeper currents of belonging and connection that shape our reality. This work challenges the primacy of the mental and emotional bodies, proposing instead a holistic view where the physical and sensory dimensions hold equal significance. As we continue to map the multifaceted nature of the human being, it becomes evident that our understanding of the body must evolve beyond rationality, embracing the full spectrum of our embodied experience.

Bibliography

“Bodies in mind: using peripheral psychophysiology to probe emotional and social processes” Gina M. Grimshaw, M. Philipp · 29. Juli 2020

“Moral emotions and moral behavior.” June P Tangney, J. Stuewig, Debra J. Mashek · 21. Dez. 2007

“Bidirectional contextual influence between faces and bodies in emotion perception.” Maya Lecker, R. Dotsch, Gijsbert Bijlstra, Hillel Aviezer · 1. Okt. 2020

“Bodies, Representations, Situations, Practices: Qualitative Research on Affect, Emotion and Feeling.” M. Willis, J. Cromby · 2. Jan. 2020

“The feeling of being.” M. Ratcliffe · 2005

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Philosophical anthropology examines the essence and distinctiveness of human beings by exploring complex facets of human existence, such as consciousness and societal constructs. This field merges insights from philosophy, psychology, and sociology to articulate a comprehensive view of what it means to be human. In my analysis, I focus on one aspect of our being—the mental body, alongside the physical, emotional, and archetypal dimensions. This paper specifically examines the mental body and the role of the ego, providing a nuanced perspective deeply influenced by Jung’s theories and phenomenology. My approach emphasizes that humans are complex systems embedded within a broader cosmic framework, which paradoxically originates from within. By exploring the mental body, we aim to understand the intricate interplay between the ego and our broader human experience, revealing how our perceptions and identities are shaped by this dynamic. My philosophical inquiry is deeply informed by my practical experiences in clinical therapy, supervision, and the analysis of various psychological conditions encountered in my role as an art therapist. Additionally, my cultural and linguistic background enriches my perspective, allowing me to approach the subject from multiple angles.

Argument

The mental body is linked to the cerebral processes of thought, through which consciousness crafts our perceived reality, utilizing thought as a mechanism of organization. Inevitably, the ego assumes the role of a conductor, orchestrating the analysis and structuring of our perceived world. However, it does not operate in isolation; it is nourished by the experiences derived from the physical body, which instruct the brain on what should be perceived as perilous or safe, thus establishing the foundational dualistic notion of good and evil. Over time, as an individual matures, the ego shapes a filter of habits through which experiences are interpreted. The ego is tethered to our comprehension of daily existence within the physical and material realm. Hence, we must not elevate the instrument of thought to the primary means for comprehending the internal and external realities of the human condition.

Support

Jung articulates a concept saying: “The ego is the subject of all successful attempts at adaptation so far as these are achieved by the will. The ego, therefore, is by no means identical with the self, but is merely its most highly developed and most highly conscious part, its leading end, which often tries to drag the self in its wake. It has the capacity to convert the sum of luminous perceptions of the outer world into stable ideas and concepts, and thus to build up the world of reason.” This suggests that it is through the act of thinking that the human brain transforms an experience into action.

Take, for instance, the amygdala: this region of the brain orchestrates the response to fear, essentially safeguarding the physical body from potential mortal threats. This response begins as a primal instinct. However, without this instinct being refined into an emotion and subsequently formulated into thought, an immediate reaction to the imminent threat of death does not occur. Studies using brain imaging techniques, such as fMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging), have shown how different parts of the brain communicate when responding to threats. The amygdala detects danger and quickly sends signals to the prefrontal cortex, where the information is processed to decide on the action to take based on past experiences, current context, and predicted outcomes.

In psychiatric conditions such as anxiety disorders or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), this pathway can become dysregulated. For instance, in PTSD, the amygdala is often hyperactive, leading to an exaggerated fear response to perceived threats. Treatment strategies, including cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) and certain medications, aim to modify these responses by altering how the brain processes these fear signals.

The ego, through its incessant internal discourse, significantly influences the interpretation, response, and construction of external reality. Yet, this external reality is intrinsically linked and not distinct from the internal mechanisms, which I explore through a phenomenological lens. It acts as a filter, distorting the external reality and projecting it onto the inner membrane of the Jungian Self. Thus, it forms perceptions and opinions about the external world but fails to capture its true essence.

The writings of Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty highlight the connection between perception and lived experience, asserting that all perception is shaped by the observer’s intentions and historical experiences. Merleau-Ponty posits that perception is fundamentally subjective, always filtered through the individual’s personal experiences and their physical interaction with the world.

Carl Jung proposed that the Self serves as a mediator bridging the conscious and unconscious realms of the psyche, and he highlighted how the ego can sometimes veil the profound insights that emerge from the unconscious. He explored the notion that archetypes and the collective unconscious shape our perceptions, which can be misinterpreted or skewed by the ego’s subjective lens: “The self is not only the center but also the whole circumference which embraces both conscious and unconscious; it is the center of this totality, just as the ego is the center of consciousness. […] It might equally be called the ‘self,’ inasmuch as the essential elements of the personality, the archetype, and the collective unconscious are united in it. However, since the ego is only the center of my field of consciousness, it is not identical to the totality of my psyche, being merely a complex among other complexes. Hence I discriminate between the ego and the self, since the ego is only the subject of my consciousness, whereas the self is the subject of my totality: hence it also includes the unconscious psyche. In this sense, the self would be an ideal completeness.”

Certainly, my discussion does not reduce the entirety of human essence to the ego. This paper merely serves as a fragment of a broader dissertation aiming to chart the full landscape of human nature. Philosophically, this raises a compelling question: if human beings are neither the mere product of their inner dialogues nor wholly encapsulated by these dialogues, what are they? To engage deeply with philosophical anthropology and to grasp the nuances of human existence, it is essential to transcend the egoic filters that have evolved as survival mechanisms within the Self. This detachment is vital for a purer exploration of what it means to be human, unencumbered by the biases of our constructed identities.

Counterpoints

The following statements are various philosophical perspectives that challenge the necessity of transcending egoic filters to fully understand human essence: Within the materialist framework, humans are often seen as integrations of biological and physical processes. According to this view, human consciousness and the ego are not veils obscuring some deeper essence but are rather products of evolutionary and genetic processes that aim at survival and reproduction- the habit ingrained in us over the course of human history. From this perspective, epitomized in Richard Dawkins’ “The Selfish Gene,” human behaviors are interpreted through the lens of evolutionary biology, where genetic survival supersedes psychological constructs. This approach suggests that transcending these ‘filters’ might overlook essential mechanisms that define human existence. Genes play a crucial role in human existence; however, I will address them in the context of the physical body rather than the ego in my subsequent essays.

The proposition that the process of thought complicates our grasp of human essence does not detract from its centrality in material existence and conscious daily life. Thought serves as the fundamental gateway through which understanding is initiated. However, the manner in which we engage with thought often blurs the line between reality and our habitual perceptions of it—a habituation developed across generations and both prenatal and postnatal. Thus, the biological imperative for survival and reproduction is intricately programmed within the ego’s construct.

Existential thinkers offer a counterargument: the pursuit of an essence beyond immediate lived experience is inherently fruitless because essence is precisely that which is enacted through existence. Jean-Paul Sartre’s iconic assertion that “existence precedes essence” implies that humans define themselves through their actions, not through a pre-existing essence obscured by the ego. For Sartre, human identity is a construct of actions and choices, not an underlying essence awaiting discovery. I must concede that I find myself unable to align with this perspective, as it suggests that human identity is derived solely from actions rather than existence in itself. Does this imply that my existence ceases in the absence of the active ego function of choice? Or might my very existence encompass action and choice without being wholly defined by them? This premise compels us to distinguish between ‘human doing’ and ‘human essence.’

Perhaps it is feasible to acknowledge the active aspect of human essence within the broader schema, yet it would be erroneous to elevate it to a position of central importance. Phenomenologists like Maurice Merleau-Ponty argue against detaching from the ego, asserting that understanding human essence requires engaging with both personal and collective consciousness. Merleau-Ponty emphasizes embodied perception, revealing that human essence is accessible through active engagement with the world, mediated by our bodies and cognitive processes, including the ego. He suggests a profound connection between body, mind, and world in exploring the self. Consequently, I perceive an imperative to investigate all dimensions and manifestations of human existence to the fullest extent that our worldly cognitive capacities allow. This endeavor necessitates adopting a more expansive perspective and endeavoring to distance ourselves from the Ego—to which we are profoundly entwined—without becoming entirely detached. The act of centralization, in itself, tends to engender complications.

Conclusion

In exploring the mental body alongside the physical, emotional, and archetypal dimensions within this study, it becomes evident that human consciousness, while central, does not singularly define our existence. Our engagement with thought as the primary tool in philosophical inquiries into human nature, though profound, reveals limitations that necessitate a broader examination. This paper argues that understanding the full complexity of human beings requires transcending the centrality of the ego and embracing the paradoxical, beautiful, and complex entirety of human existence.

The ego, as articulated through Jung’s perspective, serves as a critical intermediary in our conscious interactions but does not encompass the whole of our psychological landscape. Recognizing this, the phenomenological approach allows us to explore the nuanced interplay between the ego and the deeper, often unconscious elements of the psyche. This exploration is crucial for appreciating how perceptions and identities are not merely products of isolated cerebral activities but are deeply influenced by a confluence of various existential forces. Moreover, the concept of the ego as a filter, which both shapes and distorts our engagement with the world, invites a reevaluation of how we define reality. The philosophical challenge then becomes one of integrating these diverse aspects of human experience—acknowledging that while the ego contributes to our survival by structuring our perceptions, it also potentially obscures the richer textures of existence that transcend immediate sensory experiences or psychological reactions.

Thus, philosophical anthropology, as it grapples with these intricate dimensions, does not merely seek to dissect human nature into comprehensible parts but strives to synthesize a holistic view that honors the inherent complexity and inherent beauty of being human. In doing so, it invites ongoing dialogue and inquiry into what it means to live fully aware of the myriad influences—both seen and unseen—that shape our thoughts, actions, and interactions. This inquiry into the mental body and its connections to broader existential questions does not reduce human essence to mere products of thought or biological imperatives. Instead, it underscores the importance of a more profound engagement with the philosophical underpinnings that consider the full spectrum of human experience. By transcending the limitations imposed by the ego, we open ourselves to a more authentic understanding of human nature, one that embraces the paradoxes and complexities that define our existence.

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