The Pulse of Power: Carl Schmitt’s Radical Theory of Political Form

This essay is my additional thoughts on Carl Schmitt’s framing of the concept of the political form. I offer them to help flesh out my earlier essay. Carl Schmitt, who is one of the most provocative and influential political thinkers of the twentieth century, remains a figure of enduring debate in political thought. While he is often remembered primarily for his formulation of politics in terms of the “friend-enemy” distinction, his contributions extend far beyond this frequently cited idea. Schmitt’s work on political form represents a crucial aspect of his intellectual legacy, providing profound insight into how political communities organize authority, sustain unity, and preserve sovereignty. His concept of political form, articulated most fully in Verfassungslehre (Constitutional Theory, 1928) and Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form (Roman Catholicism and Political Form, 1923), emphasizes the historically grounded and institutionally embodied nature of political life. Unlike abstract liberal theories that focus primarily on procedural governance or legal norms, Schmitt locates the essence of politics in the existential capacity of a community to decide, act, and endure, making his work especially relevant to understanding political authority and institutional order.

For Schmitt, politics is not reducible to administration, legal procedures, or the distribution of resources. At its core, politics is an existential activity: it concerns the decisions a community makes about its very existence. Political form, in Schmitt’s thought, refers to the concrete and historically specific way in which a community organizes authority, identity, and decision-making to sustain itself over time. This concept is inseparable from his broader understanding of the political as existential, in which the capacity to make decisive interventions defines the essence of authority. Schmitt distinguishes between a normative and a positive conception of constitution. The normative approach treats a constitution as a set of abstract rules or procedures, whereas the positive conception views the constitution as the concrete expression of a people’s decision to exist as a unified political entity. Political form is inseparable from this latter view: it is the way in which political unity is materially realized and preserved through institutions, symbols, and practices. This existential dimension marks a departure from liberal legalism, which prioritizes procedural fairness and abstract rights over collective cohesion and decisive action.

Central to Schmitt’s account of political form is the concept of sovereignty. He famously asserts, “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception,” emphasizing that ultimate authority resides not in the ordinary rule of law but in the capacity to suspend or reinterpret rules when necessary to preserve the political community. Sovereignty is not a passive adherence to legal norms; it is the locus of decision-making in moments of crisis. Political form, therefore, requires a clear center of authority capable of determining the community’s fate. Whether embodied in a monarch, a constitutionally empowered president, or a religious leader, sovereignty constitutes the backbone of political form, as it enables a community to act decisively and maintain unity under conditions of threat or emergency.

In Verfassungslehre, Schmitt develops a systematic theory of political form as constitutional unity, arguing that the constitution is not primarily a legal text but a political act. The constitution reflects the people’s existential choice regarding the type of political life they wish to pursue, whether monarchy or republic, democracy or dictatorship. Legal norms and procedures derive their authority from this foundational political decision. In contrast to liberal constitutionalism, which treats the constitution as a neutral framework for the contestation of competing interests, Schmitt emphasizes that every constitutional form embodies substantive choices about sovereignty, authority, and unity. Claims to neutrality are themselves political stances; they cannot be disentangled from the underlying decisions that define the community’s political existence.

Political unity is central to Schmitt’s understanding of a robust political form. A political community exists only insofar as it maintains a coherent identity through a recognizable structure of authority. In this respect, pluralism, proceduralism, and legal formalism—hallmarks of liberal democratic systems—are potential threats. Schmitt viewed the Weimar Republic as a vivid example of this vulnerability. Its embrace of liberal pluralism and proceduralism, he argued, failed to constitute a genuine political form, leaving the state exposed to fragmentation and paralysis. For Schmitt, a resilient political form must be capable of withstanding crises and exceptions, moments when ordinary legal rules are insufficient. Sovereign decision-making is essential in such circumstances, allowing the community to reassert unity and preserve its existence. This emphasizes that political form is inseparable from the institutions that embody authority, including the executive, legislative, and legal apparatuses, as well as symbols and rituals that communicate the community’s identity. Institutionalization is thus fundamental: a political form is operative, not merely theoretical, capable of organizing, defending, and renewing itself through concrete structures.

Schmitt’s earlier work, Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form, expands the concept of political form beyond the state to analyze the Roman Catholic Church as a paradigmatic instance of enduring political order. The Church exemplifies how a community can sustain authority, identity, and unity over centuries through both organizational structure and cultural coherence. Its hierarchical system—comprising the pope, cardinals, bishops, and clergy—enables the coherent exercise of authority across diverse national and cultural contexts. Doctrines, rituals, and symbols provide a shared foundation for legitimacy and collective identity. Schmitt admires the Church precisely because it combines universality with concrete organizational specificity, maintaining unity and authority in a manner that transcends temporal and geographical boundaries.

A key concept in Schmitt’s account of the Church is complexio oppositorum, or the unification of opposites. The Church embodies tensions between spirit and institution, faith and authority, divine mission and earthly hierarchy. Rather than constituting a weakness, this capacity to institutionalize contradiction fosters resilience and durability. Political form, in Schmitt’s view, must accommodate internal tensions without collapsing into disorder. The Church stands in contrast to liberalism, which seeks to resolve or neutralize contradictions in the name of procedural fairness or relativism, often at the expense of coherent authority. By institutionalizing contradiction, the Church achieves a durable unity that procedural liberalism struggles to attain.

Schmitt’s critique of liberalism extends beyond institutional concerns to a broader cultural critique. Liberalism, with its emphasis on individual rights, proceduralism, and economic rationality, lacks a unifying political form. It prioritizes debate over decision, plurality over unity, and process over substance. In Schmitt’s view, this formlessness undermines the state’s capacity to act decisively and coherently, leaving political communities vulnerable to internal decay and external threats. In contrast, enduring political forms—whether embodied in a constitution or a religious institution—maintain coherence, assert authority, and generate legitimacy through the integration of culture, history, and institutional design.

From Schmitt’s analysis, several defining characteristics of political form emerge. Political form is concrete and historical, rooted in the unique traditions, conditions, and choices of a particular community. It cannot be abstractly deduced or externally imposed, as it is intimately connected to lived political reality. It is oriented around unity, achieved through visible representation in a sovereign, constitution, or institutional leader who embodies the community’s identity and authority. Sovereign decision-making, particularly in moments of crisis, is indispensable, as it ensures that the political community can act decisively to maintain coherence. Finally, political form is institutional and cultural, drawing legitimacy from shared rituals, symbols, and organizational structures, rather than purely legalistic or procedural foundations.

Schmitt’s conception of political form can be further illuminated through comparison with other theorists. Claude Lefort, for example, describes democratic political form as characterized by the “empty place of power,” emphasizing openness, contestation, and the symbolic displacement of authority. In contrast, Schmitt emphasizes visible representation, decisive decision-making, and coherent unity. From Schmitt’s perspective, Lefort’s democratic pluralism risks fragmentation, for it fails to provide a clear locus of authority capable of sustaining political cohesion. While Lefort celebrates indeterminacy as a democratic virtue, Schmitt interprets it as a structural weakness, indicative of formlessness and vulnerability.

Comparison with Aristotle reveals further distinctions. Aristotle’s notion of politeia integrates institutional arrangements with ethical orientation, evaluating political forms based on their promotion of the common good. Schmitt, by contrast, de-emphasizes moral evaluation in favor of existential criteria. The value of a political form lies not in its ethical orientation or outcomes, but in its capacity to maintain unity, sovereignty, and institutional coherence. In this sense, Schmitt’s realism, with its focus on existential survival rather than justice or virtue, represents a sharp departure from classical thought.

Schmitt’s insights into political form have considerable contemporary relevance. In contexts of institutional crisis, state failure, or authoritarian resurgence, his emphasis on sovereignty, decisive action, and institutional coherence provides valuable analytical tools. Crises—whether caused by war, terrorism, pandemics, or economic collapse—often require the suspension of ordinary legal norms and reveal the true locus of authority. Schmitt’s theory clarifies why, in such moments, legal procedures matter less than the ability to make binding decisions that preserve political existence. However, his framework also carries significant normative risks. By valorizing unity, decisive authority, and hierarchical institutions, Schmitt’s thought can be interpreted as providing justification for authoritarianism. While his critique of liberal pluralism is compelling as a diagnosis of institutional weakness, his proposed remedies—centralized authority, hierarchical order, and decisive sovereign action—can undermine democratic freedoms and pluralistic governance.

In a world marked by technocratic governance, global capitalism, and fragmented identities, many political systems struggle to maintain coherent forms. Schmitt’s critique of liberal formlessness resonates with those who perceive contemporary politics as lacking decisive authority, coherent identity, or institutional effectiveness. Yet, the challenge remains to balance unity and sovereignty with legitimacy, pluralism, and democratic participation. Schmitt’s insights highlight the risks of institutional decay while provoking critical reflection on the conditions required for durable political authority.

In conclusion, Carl Schmitt’s concept of political form, developed in Verfassungslehre and Römischer Katholizismus und politische Form, provides a powerful and unsettling framework for understanding how political communities are constituted and maintained. Political form is the concrete expression of a community’s existential decision to exist as a unified and sovereign entity, grounded in history, culture, and institutional order. It embodies unity, sovereign decision-making, and the capacity to act decisively, especially in moments of crisis. Whether one accepts or rejects Schmitt’s conclusions, his work compels reflection on essential questions of political authority: how legitimacy is constituted, what sustains political unity, and who decides when normal rules are insufficient. In a world of fragmented identities, weakened institutions, and procedural gridlock, Schmitt’s theory of political form remains both relevant and provocative, offering enduring insights into the structures that allow political communities to survive, act, and endure.