Dead Gaze, No Redemption

Introduction

The question of subjectivity has always been central to philosophy, but with the advent of digital technologies, new frameworks for understanding the self have emerged. One particularly intriguing challenge comes from gaming perspectives: can a second-person perspective exist within a video game? This is not merely a technical or artistic question; it is a deep philosophical problem concerning self-awareness, agency, and the nature of observation. Traditional gaming perspectives fall into first-person, where the player experiences the world directly through a character’s eyes, or third-person, where they observe the character from an external viewpoint. The second-person perspective, by contrast, presents a paradox. In linguistics, the second person refers to “you,” implying direct address and interaction, but when translated into gaming, this creates an epistemological and ontological tension: who is the observer, and who is being observed? This paper argues that a sustained second-person perspective in gaming is impossible, not merely for technical reasons but because it contradicts the fundamental structures of human subjectivity.

This small research project also functions as a supplementary exploration alongside my MA thesis on human embodiment, which is why I find Varela, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty particularly compelling in their examination of this subject.

1. Second-Person Perspective in Video Games

The exploration of subjectivity in interactive media offers a fascinating avenue to reassess the nature of perspective, an epistemological and aesthetic construct that has long preoccupied philosophy and literature. Two recent examinations of second-person perspectives in video games, presented in video essays by the YouTubers Action Button and Jacob Geller, challenge the conventional classifications of first-person and third-person viewpoints. These analyses not only reconsider the conceptual architecture of gaming narratives but also engage with broader ontological and phenomenological concerns regarding self-awareness, agency, and embodiment.

1.1 A Neglected Epistemology in Gaming

Traditionally, video game perspectives are understood as either first-person, wherein the player experiences the game world directly through the eyes of the agent, or third-person, where the agent is observed from an external vantage point. The question posed by Action Button in their discussion of Driver: San Francisco disrupts this binary: What might a truly second-person game look like? This inquiry unveils a critical gap in gaming terminology—one that mirrors the conceptual lacunae in philosophical discussions of selfhood and alterity.

A case study emerges in the form of Driver: San Francisco, particularly its mission titled “The Target.” The protagonist, John Tanner, possesses the uncanny ability to shift into other characters’ bodies, a conceit that effectively constructs a second-person viewpoint. In this mission, Tanner inhabits the body of Ordell, a henchman assigned to capture none other than Tanner himself. This paradoxical scenario positions the player as subject and object, controller and controlled. The player navigates the world through Ordell, yet their true self, as Tanner, remains a separate entity being pursued. This inversion of conventional gaming mechanics evokes a profound, almost uncanny, sense of out-of-body awareness, challenging the player’s conception of identity and control.

This moment of self-alienation resonates with philosophical theories of double consciousness, where the self is both observer and observed. If, as Descartes postulated, subjectivity is founded on an indivisible cogito, Driver: San Francisco offers a counterpoint wherein the self is split between actor and acted-upon, interrogating the stability of the gaming subject.

Beyond the immediate epistemological conundrum, the game’s structural affordances allow for an emergent deviation from the intended narrative arc. Action Button recounts their own experience of subverting the game’s intended linearity, venturing into the open world beyond the mission’s prescribed boundaries. This divergence from predetermined objectives underscores an implicit tension between game design as control and player agency as resistance. Such unexpected transgressions within the game world mirror broader discourses in philosophy and literary theory regarding the tension between structure and freedom. Kant’s delineation of reason’s limits in the Critique of Pure Reason finds an analogue here—structured narratives provide order, yet the subjective impulse seeks transcendence beyond imposed constraints.

1.2 The Phenomenology of Second-Person Gaming

Jacob Geller’s analysis expands upon this conceptual terrain, foregrounding the linguistic and cinematographic genealogy of second-person perspectives. Drawing upon film theory, the video examines how certain cinematic techniques approximate a second-person perspective, though such an approach remains largely underdeveloped in gaming discourse.

A particularly illuminating experiment described in Geller’s analysis involves an NPC equipped with a camera that follows the player, generating an unsettling sensation of being watched. This dynamic complicates the notion of perspectival authority: in most games, the player controls the gaze, yet here, an externalized perspective exerts control over the player’s experience. This inversion invites existential anxieties akin to Sartrean notions of the gaze, wherein the realization of being observed disrupts one’s assumed autonomy.

Furthermore, Geller problematizes the linguistic application of “first-person,” “second-person,” and “third-person” to gaming perspectives. While these terms are borrowed from grammatical structures, their translation to visual and interactive mediums remains imperfect. This linguistic interrogation aligns with post-structuralist concerns regarding the inadequacy of language to encapsulate embodied experience fully.

These explorations ultimately invite a re-evaluation of how we conceive perspective in interactive media. The second-person perspective, elusive in traditional gaming discourse, presents an avenue for further theoretical exploration. It compels a reconsideration of the self as both perceiver and perceived, challenging notions of player subjectivity and agency. Moreover, the cultural reception of second-person games, such as the ongoing campaign to restore Driver: San Francisco to digital storefronts, reveals an emergent communal engagement with the preservation of experimental and transgressive game design. This discourse echoes broader efforts to maintain access to formative works within digital culture, underscoring the cultural significance of interactive media as an evolving artistic form.

1.3 Conclusion

The second-person perspective in gaming, though rarely articulated in mainstream discourse, reveals latent philosophical and artistic potentials. As gaming technology and storytelling evolve, so too does the capacity for more nuanced explorations of identity, agency, and perception. The analyses provided by Action Button and Jacob Geller serve as a critical intervention, bridging gaming criticism with philosophical inquiry and media theory. Just as literature and film have historically expanded the boundaries of human self-understanding, video games now offer a new frontier for engaging with the complexities of subjectivity and perspective.

2. Gaming as a Metaphor for Subjectivity

The phenomenon offers a powerful metaphor for philosophical discussions on subjectivity. The existentialist notion of selfhood, particularly as developed by Sartre, is built upon the tension between being-for-itself (the conscious, free agent) and being-for-others (the objectified self in the eyes of another). Sartre famously describes the gaze as the experience of suddenly becoming aware that one is being observed, transforming the subject into an object. This shift from first-person immediacy to third-person objectification is precisely what games struggle with when attempting a second-person mode. If we consider gaming as an analogy for existential subjectivity, then the impossibility of a second-person game mirrors the impossibility of truly seeing oneself from the outside without dissolving into external observation.

This discussion also recalls Kant’s transcendental unity of apperception, which asserts that self-awareness is not a passive reflection but an active synthesis:

“The ‘I think’ must accompany all my representations.” ¹

This implies that consciousness is fundamentally structured as a first-person experience. Even when we attempt to perceive ourselves from the outside, we do so through internalized frameworks that remain anchored in our own subjectivity. This aligns with the first-person and third-person perspectives in gaming but makes a sustained second-person viewpoint structurally incoherent.

Plato’s Republic provides another perspective on this issue. His concept of the divided soul suggests that selfhood already contains an inherent duality—one part of the self is the rational observer, while another part is the agent of action and desire. This aligns with the paradox we encounter in gaming: while a player may momentarily take the position of an external observer, they remain tied to the agency of their in-game avatar. Even in an environment where the player’s character is being directly addressed by another entity, the experience never fully shifts into a second-person mode because the player’s cognition remains rooted in their own subjectivity.

3. The Role of Media in Shaping Subjectivity

These questions raise further issues about the relationship between media and self-awareness. Did filmography and gaming transform our sense of introspection, or were these media forms created precisely because we already understood subjectivity in these terms? Sartre’s idea that “God is dead” takes on a new form here, not in Nietzsche’s proclamation of divine absence but in the realization that the observer traditionally represented by God has moved inside our own consciousness:

“Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to conceive it. Man is nothing else but what he makes of himself.” ²

We no longer experience an external, divine watchful presence but instead internalize an ever-present introspective observer. Gaming, film, and digital media may not have created this internal observer, but they have certainly externalized and formalized it, allowing us to manipulate and experience it in new ways.

Francisco Varela’s neurophenomenology further supports this analysis. Varela emphasizes that cognition is not an internal computational process but an embodied and enactive experience. This aligns with the difficulty of sustaining a second-person perspective in gaming. If subjectivity arises through embodied interaction with the world, then attempting to position the player simultaneously as self and other disrupts this cognitive framework. Driver: San Francisco provides an accidental case study in this regard—by making the player control a character who is observing themselves, the game momentarily fractures the embodied flow of action, creating an uncanny and disorienting effect.

The failure of second-person gaming thus becomes a crucial point in understanding how perception operates. If gaming perspectives reflect structures of selfhood, then this limitation reveals something fundamental about consciousness: we are either subjects or objects, never both simultaneously. The experimentations in gaming may hint at the liminal spaces between these modes, but they ultimately reaffirm the traditional philosophical view that subjectivity is anchored in the first-person perspective.

4. Future Philosophical Questions

The impossibility of second-person gaming opens new avenues for philosophical inquiry. If technology advances further, particularly in AI and virtual reality, could we one day construct an experience that truly places the player in a second-person position? Would this require a reconfiguration of cognitive perception itself? Furthermore, does gaming reveal something new about self-awareness, or does it simply externalize pre-existing mental structures? These are not just theoretical concerns but questions that will shape the future of human interaction with digital media. A more radical question emerges when considering media evolution: has gaming, like film before it, shaped the way we perceive ourselves? Or was the framework of subjectivity already present, merely waiting for these media forms to materialize? The philosophical stakes are high because they touch upon the very way in which human beings experience existence. If we are forever trapped in the first-person perspective, then attempts to simulate the second-person view only highlight the impossibility of escaping our own subjectivity.

5. Conclusion

The idea of a second-person gaming perspective is not just an interesting design challenge; it is a philosophical impossibility rooted in the nature of consciousness. As Sartre, Kant, Husserl, and Plato each suggest in different ways, self-awareness requires a fundamental unity of subjectivity that cannot be split into both observer and observed at the same time. Gaming perspectives, far from breaking new ground in this regard, only reaffirm these insights by demonstrating that any attempt to sustain a second-person mode collapses back into first- or third-person frameworks.

This impossibility does not indicate a failure of gaming but rather points to a deeper truth about the structure of experience itself. Whether media has reshaped our introspective observer or merely revealed it remains an open question, but what is certain is that the self remains an enduring mystery that neither gaming nor philosophy has yet fully unraveled.

 

Link to footnotes and Bibliography